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Beyond Severability 
Lisa Marshall Manheim 
ABSTRACT: Severability is a wrecking ball. Even the most cautious use of 
this doctrine demolishes statutes in contravention of legislative intent and 
without adequate justification. It does so through the imposition of an 
artificially restrictive framework: one that requires that courts respond to a 
statute’s constitutional flaw by disregarding that statute either in whole or in 
part. In the last few years alone, this framework has flattened the Voting 
Rights Act, threatened the Bankruptcy Code, and nearly toppled the 
Affordable Care Act. Yet courts apply severability reflexively, never 
demanding justification for its destructive treatment. Scholars, meanwhile, 
assiduously debate the particulars of the severability rules without questioning 
whether those rules should apply in the first place. This Article, insisting that 
severability justify its prominent position among the tools of statutory 
construction, concludes that it should be abolished. Courts should replace it 
with a fundamentally broader inquiry into, first, the constructions of a 
constitutionally defective statute that would diffuse its constitutional defects, 
and, second, which among these options the legislature would prefer.  
  Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. I am indebted to those who 
have offered insights in furtherance of this project, including Kate Andrias, Eric Berger, Ryan 
Calo, Eric Fish, Brianne Gorod, Sanne Knudsen, Anita Krug, Shannon Weeks McCormack, 
Elizabeth Porter, Zahr Said, Kathryn Watts, and David Ziff, as well as the participants at the Seattle 
Junior Faculty Forum. Grateful acknowledgement is due to Dane Westermeyer, Thomas Miller, 
and the research librarians at the Gallagher Law Library for outstanding research assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In one of the most consequential cases heard by the Roberts Court—
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius1—four justices in dissent 
attacked not only the specific outcome reached by the majority, but the very 
approach those justices took to their judicial role. Accusing the majority of 
“vast judicial overreaching,”2 the four argued that the Court had more than 
simply erred; it had engaged in “judicial usurpation.”3 What, according to the 
dissent, was the nature of this judicial crime? It was construing the Affordable 
Care Act in a manner that permitted most of the statute to continue in 
operation. More specifically, it was the majority’s application of the so-called 
“severability” doctrine—a framework for analysis requiring a court to 
disregard an unconstitutional statute in whole or in part—that triggered the 
impassioned attack. What, then, was the dissent’s preferred, more judicially 
restrained alternative? It was to strike down the entire Act. According to the 
dissent, complete invalidation of the Affordable Care Act was the only 
response consistent with the values that should guide a court engaging with a 
congressionally enacted statute: “caution,” “minimalism,” and “judicial 
modesty.”4 
The tension is startling. On the one hand are calls for judicial restraint 
and modesty; on the other, a willingness to reach conclusions about statutes 
that destroy their operation. Despite the inherent friction in the dissent’s 
position, attempts by the majority in National Federation to defend its opinion 
against these attacks fell flat—or, at least, they lacked the rhetorical power 
churning through the dissent. This was not due to oversight or neglect by the 
five in the majority. It turns out it is surprisingly difficult to explain why taking 
a more flexible approach to a constitutionally defective statute might not be, 
in the words of the dissent, “a more extreme exercise of the judicial power 
than striking the whole statute.”5 It is similarly difficult to justify why a court, 
when engaging in a more accommodating form of severability analysis, is not 
impermissibly “impos[ing] on the Nation, by the Court’s decree, its own new 
statutory regime, consisting of policies, risks, and duties that Congress did not 
enact.”6 To the contrary, as soon as one accepts that the “severability” 
framework controls, it proves extraordinarily difficult to resist accusations like 
those lodged by the National Federation dissent. Understanding the 
fundamental error of the criticism—and of the National Federation dissent—
therefore requires taking a step back: asking whether “severability” should 
apply at all. 
 
 1.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2.  Id. at 2676 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 3.  Id. at 2668. 
 4.  Id. at 2676. 
 5.  Id. at 2668. 
 6.  Id. 
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This Article embraces this overlooked question. And it reaches what may 
seem like a radical conclusion. Notwithstanding the ranks of courts and 
scholars who reflexively accept severability as a framework for construing 
constitutionally flawed statutes,7 this Article concludes, quite to the contrary, 
that severability should lose its prominent place in the doctrine. It is a deeply 
flawed framework for analysis that, in the last three years alone, has imperiled 
the Voting Rights Act,8 the Bankruptcy Code,9 and the Affordable Care Act,10 
to name but a few examples. Even when taken on its own terms, the 
severability framework cannot justify what it does to statutes. 
This Article is the first to reach this result. While elaborate and 
impassioned scholarly debates continue to unfold over severability’s 
specifics—how exactly the doctrine should be articulated and applied11—near 
silence reigns with respect to whether severability’s fundamental framework 
is appropriate for the problems that it purports to resolve. Instead, courts and 
scholars take most of severability for granted. They accept, nearly without fail, 
that courts should turn to “severability” when grappling with constitutionally 
defective statutes,12 that severability’s analytical framework requires courts to 
disregard statutes either in whole or in part,13 and that legislative intent must 
play a central role in the courts’ conclusions.14 Courts and scholars also tend 
to agree on what motivates severability’s framework: the often stated but rarely 
defined principle of judicial restraint.15 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 740 (2010) 
(“Current law and scholarship [maintain] that severability doctrine is the exclusive way to deal 
with partial unconstitutionality.”); see generally infra Part II.A (exploring the reflexive acceptance 
that severability enjoys from both scholars and the courts). 
 8.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); infra Part II.B. 
 9.  See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); infra Part II.B. 
 10.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2566; infra Part II.B. 
 11.  See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41,  
41–42 (1995) (compiling list of scholarly works that, collectively, have criticized severability “on 
almost every conceivable basis”); see also Tom Campbell, Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 
1495, 1497 n.3 (2011) (same). 
 12.  See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
 14.  This third area of consensus may strike some as surprising, given that it addresses the 
role that legislative intent (an oft-maligned concept in the world statutory interpretation and 
construction) plays in the analysis. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 528 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“[The Court] should not pretend to care about legislative intent (as opposed to 
the meaning of the law) . . . .”); see also id. at 519 (“We are governed by laws, not by the intentions 
of legislators.”). Yet legislative intent plays a central role in every articulation of the severability 
test, and the eight members of the current Supreme Court (as well as the most recently departed 
member of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia) agree that severability requires a court to discern 
and effectuate legislative intent. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 292 (1994) (discussing principles of “legislative supremacy” and “judicial restraint” and 
their interaction with the “function-oriented severability test”); see generally infra Part II.B 
(describing how courts and scholars invoke judicial restraint in the context of severability). 
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These points of consensus over severability’s general contours mask its 
deep and consequential flaws. Seemingly innocuous in its basic operation, 
severability in actuality limits courts to an artificial and highly restrictive 
inquiry: whether a court should disregard an unconstitutional statute in whole 
or in part. Once triggered, it does not permit any other judicial response to 
what this Article terms “constitutionally disrupted statutes”: statutes that, due 
to some conflict with the Constitution, cannot operate as enacted. More 
specifically, severability forbids courts from employing a range of responses 
that are permissible in other legal contexts. These include construing a statute 
in a way that expands the reach of its applications,16 disregarding, or otherwise 
altering, a portion of the statute that is not considered to be the most 
immediate source of the unconstitutionality,17 and construing the statute in a 
nonstandard manner.18 
Emerging trends in severability seek to narrow these options even 
further. These developments, which signal a newer and more severe form of 
severability, prohibit a court from construing a constitutionally disrupted 
statute in any manner that affords the court too much discretion.19 They 
similarly resist the use of so-called “application severability,” a well-established 
and previously uncontroversial approach to statutory construction that works 
by invalidating a statute’s unconstitutional applications rather than portions 
of its text.20 Severability has long accommodated these two methods. Yet 
objections to both appear to be growing increasingly prominent, and this 
newer form of severability threatens massive interference with the work of the 
legislature. Such interference will only compound severability’s already 
destructive effects.21 
This Article identifies and describes these limitations in an effort to 
demonstrate how severability drastically restricts what a court can do in its 
efforts to “save” constitutionally disrupted legislation. It reveals, moreover, 
that these restrictions have their effects at the expense of the democratic will. 
Despite the near consensus over the central role that legislative intent plays 
in severability analysis, legislative intent does not overcome severability’s 
restrictions. The restrictions exist even if Congress would have preferred 
otherwise.22 What this means is that severability, which claims to effectuate 
legislative intent, actually contravenes it. Its framework limits the analytical 
approaches a court can take, and it does so irrespective of legislative intent. 
 
 16.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
 17.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 18.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 19.  See infra Part III.A.4. 
 20.  See infra Part III.A.5. 
 21.  See infra Part III.B. 
 22.  See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text (discussing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)). 
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Severability’s aggressively restrictive framework also creates unsettling 
discrepancies in the case law. Though courts routinely employ certain 
analytical approaches in other legal contexts,23 these same analytical 
approaches are deemed, in the context of severability, to be more than merely 
disfavored. They are regarded as beyond the judicial function and an 
encroachment on the legislative sphere.24 
Despite severability’s many quandaries, reflexive acceptance remains the 
norm. Questioning severability’s basic framework begins to expose these 
restrictions and the contradictions they represent. It confirms, moreover, that 
the stakes are high. Severability’s restrictive framework potentially affects any 
exercise of judicial review,25 and among its effects are doctrinal confusion, a 
refusal to effectuate legislative intent, and the invalidation of wide swaths of 
Congress’s work.26 These costs are both abstract and practical: without 
severability’s restrictions, the statutory landscape across a range of subjects 
would look very different. In light of these effects, this Article demands that 
severability’s destructive effects be justified—and it concludes that they 
cannot be.27 
All this analysis leads to the same, inexorable result, which is the need for 
an improved regime. Severability, at its core, does not “limit the solution to 
the problem,”28 as it promises to do; it simply limits the solutions. An 
improved regime would return to one of severability’s animating principles: 
that courts confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute should respond by 
minimizing the disruption to that statute. This Article argues that legislative 
intent is what properly drives such analysis. By complying with unencumbered 
legislative intent, rather than the restrictive framework of severability, courts 
would interfere less drastically with the statutory code and, as such, more 
successfully respect the legislative will. The broader approach might, for 
example, have saved much of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County,29 it might 
 
 23.  See infra Part II.A (identifying these analytical approaches and explaining how each is 
used in other legal contexts). 
 24.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1333 (2000) (referring, in the context of severability, to the “well-known 
principle [that] establishes that any separation of a statute through its specification into subrules 
must not cross the vague line that divides judicial interpretation from judicial legislation”); David 
H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 641 (2008) (“Although 
[many cases] and much of the scholarly writing make the point that courts should not save 
statutes by rewriting them, the decisions in the more recent cases seem to do just that.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also infra Part II.A (identifying analytical approaches and explaining how each, in 
the context of severability, is treated as outside the judicial function). 
 25.  See, e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); Shelby Cty. v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); 
see also infra Part II.B. 
 26.  See infra Part III.B. 
 27.  See infra Part III.A. 
 28.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006). 
 29.  See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612; see also infra Part III.B. 
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have produced a less disruptive result in National Federation (while protecting 
the Affordable Care Act against the dissent’s insistence that the statute be even 
more drastically dismantled),30 and it almost certainly would have obviated 
the attacks being lodged at the bankruptcy code in the follow-up cases to Stern 
v. Marshall.31 These three examples are quite recent and high-profile, but they 
are not anomalous. To the contrary, the adjustment potentially would affect 
any statute subject to constitutional challenge. 
In making the case that the severability framework should be retired and 
replaced, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I situates the severability 
framework in contemporary case law and the scholarly literature. In so doing, 
it reveals that this framework tends to enjoy the unquestioning acceptance of 
both courts and scholars, who, at best, cite vague and undertheorized 
principles of judicial restraint in support. Part II explores the constraining 
effect that severability has on the courts and the statutes they are charged with 
construing. On the judicial branch, severability imposes a restrictive structure 
that prohibits courts from relying on a host of otherwise permissible 
approaches to statutory construction. On the legislature’s work, it imposes a 
disruptive regime that generates doctrinal confusion and stifles legislative 
intent. Part III insists that this aggressive regime justify its existence and 
effects. Concluding that it cannot, this Article closes with a proposal for 
reform. The proposed regime would ensure greater fidelity to legislative 
intent by removing severability’s artificial constraints and, in so doing, avoid 
its destructive effects. 
I. SEVERABILITY AS A BLITHELY ACCEPTED TOOL 
Severability is controversial on the margins. Debates rage over how it 
should be articulated and applied.32 Yet as an overarching framework for 
analysis, severability enjoys a rare and enviable position: courts and scholars 
tend to accept it reflexively.33 They claim to do so to fulfill a commitment to 
judicial restraint—a commitment that, in this context, is as vaguely defined as 
it is frequently invoked.34 
This Part identifies and describes these related phenomena. It begins 
with a brief description of the doctrine itself. At its core, severability is a 
response to a difficult problem that arises when a statute is deemed to be, in 
some respect, unconstitutional. The question is how to apply that statute 
going forward. Though “hardly a model of clarity,”35 current doctrine 
nevertheless can be coaxed into providing a working definition: severability is 
 
 30.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2566; see also infra Part III.B. 
 31.  Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); see also Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 
134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); infra Part III.B. 
 32.  See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 33.  See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See infra Part II.B. 
 35.  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 487 (1995). 
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a measure of whether, in response to a statute’s constitutional defect, the 
legislature would have intended for the court to disregard only the statute’s 
unconstitutional portions (in which case, the statute is “severable”), or for the 
court to disregard the entire statute (in which case, the statute is 
“inseverable”).36 Stated at this level of generality, this definition is consistent 
with virtually every leading case on severability.37 
It is important to recognize the centrality of legislative intent to this well-
established definition.38 Although the test for severability is a moving target, 
with each of the cases on severability tending to “formulate the test a little bit 
differently,”39 legislative intent remains a constant; it is the “touchstone.”40 To 
illustrate just how deeply engrained this principle is, all of the members of the 
current Supreme Court—as well as the recently deceased Justice Scalia, who 
was among the most insistent on a textualist approach to statutory 
interpretation and the most resistant to broad inquiries into legislative 
intent—repeatedly have acknowledged the central role that legislative intent 
plays in severability analysis.41 
 
 36.  See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985) (inseverable); 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934 (1983) (severable). It is worth 
acknowledging that it is not obvious ahead of time which statutory unit is at issue—particularly 
when the statute in question is complex and has been subject to amendment—and the analysis 
can be conducted multiple times. 
 37.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Free Enter. Fund 
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 
U.S. 678 (1987); Brockett, 472 U.S. at 491; Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984); Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 919. But cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See infra notes 124–32 for a 
discussion of how Booker is an outlier in this area. As discussed below, Eric Fish has offered a more 
nuanced definition of severability that renders its use more limited. See infra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
 38.  In this context, of course, legislative intent is most often understood in the conditional, 
as severability asks “what the legislature would have done, not what the legislature actually did 
[do],” in response to the statute’s constitutional defect. Walsh, supra note 7, at 740. One might 
refer to this subspecies of legislative intent as “contingent legislative intent,” a term this Article 
proposes and which in concept has been recognized by many. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 
132 S. Ct. at 2607 (articulating the relevant legislative intent standard in the conditional); Walsh, 
supra note 7, at 740–41. However, because this Article does not wade into the distinction between 
contingent legislative intent and non-contingent legislative intent, it uses the generic term 
“legislative intent” to refer to the inquiry into intent that governs under the leading definitions 
of severability analysis. 
 39.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-393). 
 40.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(No. 11-393) (“[E]very one of [the Supreme Court’s cases on severability] talks about 
congressional intent.”). 
 41.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text for a general discussion of objections to 
legislative intent. With respect to how, by contrast, legislative intent is accepted in the context of 
severability, National Federation of Indep. Bus. provides a recent illustration. In this case, every 
Justice signed onto an opinion confirming the central relevance of legislative intent. See Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2668–69 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 
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Outside of these general principles, the standards for severability fuel a 
heated debate.42 Still, these general principles—relating to severability’s basic 
definition and its central reliance on legislative intent—provide a framework 
for severability that runs consistently throughout both the case law and the 
literature.43 Despite such ubiquity, few challenge the privileged status that this 
framework enjoys. Few question whether it is correct. 
A.  THE UNQUESTIONING ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEVERABILITY FRAMEWORK BY COURTS 
AND SCHOLARS 
The severability framework, as defined above, enjoys widespread 
acceptance. Courts tend to turn to it without hesitation or deliberation when 
deciding how a statute should apply after a ruling of unconstitutionality.44 In 
the landmark 2012 health care decision, for example, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari specifically to address “the issue of severability” in light of 
the constitutional challenges to the ACA, and it scheduled a separate hour of 
oral argument to address the matter.45 In United States v. Booker,46 the Court 
granted certiorari to hear two questions: first, whether the sentencing regime 
was unconstitutional and, second, “[i]f the answer to the first question is 
‘yes,’” how the Sentencing Guidelines should apply “as a matter of severability 
analysis.”47 Despite the asserted centrality of severability to both cases, in 
neither case did the Court order briefing on the predicate question of 
whether the severability framework should apply in the first place. 
Severability also has dominated court discussions even when not raised 
or briefed by the parties. Recently, when the Court heard oral arguments in 
an important follow-up case to Stern v. Marshall,48 Justice Kagan interrupted a 
 
JJ., dissenting) (describing the “framework for severability analysis” as requiring the Court to 
“determine[] whether the now truncated statute will operate in the manner Congress intended” 
and to determine whether, “even if the remaining provisions can operate as Congress designed 
them to operate, . . . Congress would have enacted them standing alone and without the 
unconstitutional portion.”); id. at 2608 (plurality opinion) (basing its severability decision on its 
conclusion that “Congress would have wanted to preserve the rest of the Act”). It is interesting to 
note that Justice Scalia helped to author the joint dissent even after pushing back during oral 
argument on the reliance on legislative intent. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393) (counsel for challengers noting 
that “every one of [this Court’s cases on severability] talks about congressional intent”); see also 
id. at 10 (Justice Scalia expressing agreement with this characterization of the doctrine before 
asking “but is it right?”). 
 42.  See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 43.  See generally Emily Sherwin, Rules and Judicial Review, 6 LEGAL THEORY 299, 299–308 
(2000) (providing overview of doctrine). 
 44.  This may not always have been the case. According to Professor Walsh, for example, a 
regime of displacement preceded the “modern hypothetical-intent-based severability doctrine.” 
Walsh, supra note 7, at 742. 
 45.  See Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (Mem.) (2011). 
 46.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 47.  Id. at 229 n.1. 
 48.  Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). The follow-up case was Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency 
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discussion of the proper interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code to ask if what 
was facing the Court was “really a problem of severability.”49 Justice Kagan’s 
question quickly became a “focus” of the argument.50 In Shelby County v. 
Holder,51 the case declaring portions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to be 
unconstitutional, Justice Ginsburg dedicated a critical portion of her dissent 
to the argument that a different outcome had been required pursuant to 
principles of severability—even though neither the majority nor the parties 
appear to have raised the issue.52 Several Supreme Court justices have gone 
so far as to attribute “the absence of explicit severability reasoning” in prior 
cases not to reliance on some alternate framework, but rather to “implicit 
severability analysis.”53 
What courts have not done, however, is provide an explanation for why 
they so routinely resort to severability. Instead, when faced with a 
constitutionally disrupted statute, courts tend to apply severability without 
discussion, much less consideration, of other options.54 
Scholars have followed suit. Characterizing the issue as “the problem of 
what to do with partially unconstitutional laws,” one commentator has 
acknowledged that, according to both “[c]urrent law and scholarship . . . 
severability doctrine is the exclusive way to deal with partial 
unconstitutionality.”55 Similarly, in the course of arguing that “no workable 
system of judicial review could function without a large role for severability,” 
Michael Dorf has referred to “the role that severability plays in the 
background of every successful constitutional challenge.”56 
This is not to say that scholars have responded uncritically to each of the 
innumerable articulations and applications of the severability doctrine. To 
the contrary, “established doctrine on the severability of unconstitutional 
 
v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014). 
 49.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 
2165 (2014) (No. 12-1200). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 52.  Id. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 53.  Walsh, supra note 7, at 745; see also id. at n.27 (describing several cases that fall into this 
category). 
 54.  See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931 (1983) 
(accepting, without explanation, that severability analysis applies when determining the effect 
that a ruling of unconstitutionality has on a statute); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) 
(same); cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) 
(providing, as explanation for its turn to severability, that “[g]enerally speaking, when 
confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem,” and 
that “[t]he unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat or affect the validity 
of its remaining provisions”). 
 55.  See Walsh, supra note 7, at 739–40 (emphasis added). As discussed below, Professor 
Walsh is one of the very few who has actually questioned severability’s propriety as a framework. 
See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 56.  Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 370–71 (2007). 
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statutory provisions has drawn criticism on almost every conceivable basis.”57 
A sophisticated collection of works also explores related themes: the ways in 
which severability interacts with other doctrines.58 What none of these works 
does, however, is question the underlying assumption that the severability 
framework should be what guides a court’s analysis when it is engaging with a 
constitutionally disrupted statute. 
Still, on rare occasion, a scholar will push back on the dominant view and 
question whether the severability framework should play such a prominent 
role.59 Kevin Walsh, for example, has advocated for the return of what he 
considers to be “the original approach to partial unconstitutionality,” which 
he identifies as “displacement without . . . fallback law.”60 While Professor 
Walsh’s proposal represents a significant conceptual shift in how courts might 
interact with constitutionally disrupted statutes, as a practical matter it tends 
to accept the doctrinal status quo and therefore fails to address the question 
of whether a severability-type framework should be a default response to 
constitutionally disrupted statutes.61 Eric Fish, by contrast, has resisted the 
 
 57.  Movsesian, supra note 11, at 41. See also id. at 41–42 (“Commentators have condemned 
severability doctrine as too malleable and as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching and 
as encouraging judicial abdication. They have criticized the doctrine’s reliance on legislative 
intent and its disregard of legislative intent; its excessive attention to political concerns and its 
inattention to political concerns; its lack of any coherent explanation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 58.  See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 15 (exploring interactions among severability and related 
doctrines); Dorf, supra note 56 (exploring “fallback law,” which includes, in its most common 
manifestation, severability clauses); Fallon, supra note 24 (providing insight into the ways that 
principles of severability interact with principles of substantive constitutional law to affect the 
courts’ treatment of so-called “facial challenges”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About 
Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 955 (2011) (same); Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, 
Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301, 347 
(2012) (resisting efforts to conflate questions of severability analysis with questions of as-applied, 
facial, and overbreadth challenges); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 894–913 (2005) (exploring how severability informs courts’ treatment of 
facial challenges in the context of challenges to legislation as exceeding Congress’s powers); 
Sherwin, supra note 43, at 299 (exploring the extent to which competing principles of judicial 
review, including principles of severability, are able to fulfill their promise of “a modest 
conception of the role of courts in government”); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 1945, 1945–78 (1997) (connecting severability to the canon of constitutional avoidance). 
 59.  On similarly rare occasions, a scholar will reach a conclusion largely consistent with this 
Article’s, but without questioning severability’s prominent role. Professor Glenn Smith, for 
example, has proposed that courts might better effectuate legislative intent—particularly in the 
context of statutes containing a legislative veto—by engaging in “alternative approaches” to 
severability, including more precise forms of text severability and more flexible forms of 
application severability, rather than insist on the most rigid forms of the severability framework. 
See Glenn Chatmas Smith, From Unnecessary Surgery to Plastic Surgery: A New Approach to the Legislative 
Veto Severability Cases, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 400, 476 (1987). 
 60.  Walsh, supra note 7, at 755, 778. More specifically, Professor Walsh proposes an 
abandonment of legislative-intent-based severability analysis in favor of a regime whereby, 
regardless of legislative intent, the Constitution simply displaces as any statutory application that 
is in conflict. Id. at 778. 
 61.  Id. at 790 (“[T]he impact on case outcomes would be modest. . . .”). A second scholar 
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notion—so prominent in the doctrine and the literature—that severability 
should play such a dominant role. Instead, Fish treats severability analysis as 
something triggered in quite limited circumstances: namely, once a court 
already has concluded it should disregard a statute in part and is simply trying 
to determine what else, if anything, to disregard.62 As a normative matter, 
Fish’s characterization makes good sense.63 Yet courts often engage in 
severability analysis without first determining whether its rigid framework of 
invalidation is the appropriate treatment of the statutes before them.64 As a 
result, Fish’s works explore a different question than does this Article, which 
asks whether the severability doctrine can justify the predicate conclusion 
implicitly reached by any court engaging in severability analysis. More 
specifically, this Article asks whether it is proper for such a court to have 
concluded that the offending statute should indeed be invalidated in some 
respect—rather than treated in some other manner. 
Throughout these discussions, a difficult question arises: is severability 
best understood as a species of statutory construction, or as a remedy?65 This 
debate, while important, does not need resolution in this Article. Whether 
operating as construction or remedy, severability is plagued by the same 
fundamental flaws. To the extent this Article assumes that severability is a 
matter of statutory construction, this is merely for purposes of explication; the 
same conclusions adhere if severability is considered to be a remedy.66 
However characterized, what severability does is impose a restrictive framework 
on courts that cannot be justified—and therefore should be replaced. 
 
who, in a sense, has questioned the propriety of the severability framework is Tom Campbell. 
Professor Campbell takes an extreme position of arguing that separation-of-powers principles 
require that courts treat all statutes as inseverable, under the theory that anything else constitutes 
an encroachment on the legislative sphere. Campbell, supra note 11, at 1496–97. 
 62.  Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 322, 351 (2016). 
 63.  Stated otherwise, to the extent that the severability framework applies only after the 
court already has decided that it should disregard some or all portions of a statute—and, as such, 
only after the court already has concluded that the proper response to a constitutional disruption 
is not to take one of the approaches prohibited by the severability framework—that 
characterization avoids the fundamental flaws plaguing current doctrine and is largely consistent 
with this Article’s normative conclusions. See generally supra Part III. 
 64.  See supra notes 44–56 and accompanying text. 
 65.  Compare Gans, supra note 24, at 688 (arguing that severability should be considered a 
question of remedy), with John Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and Constitutional Adjudication, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56 (2014) (rejecting characterization of severability as a question of remedy 
and concluding that “[s]everability analysis is statutory construction in light of a conclusion of 
unconstitutionality”). See generally, Eric S. Fish, Severability as Conditionality, 64 EMORY L.J. 1293 
(2015) (discussing three theories of severability and proposing a fourth). 
 66.  The arguments advanced by this Article are, in a sense, actually easier to make if 
severability is considered to be an analysis regarding remedy. This is because the severability 
framework purports to impose restrictions on courts that normally do not apply in the context of 
“remedy.” For illustrations of this phenomenon, see infra notes 114–19 and accompanying text. 
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B.   THE APPEAL TO JUDICIAL RESTRAINT THAT COURTS AND SCHOLARS OFFER  
IN SUPPORT 
The dominance of the severability framework in both the case law and 
the literature might lead one to assume a sophisticated set of theories or 
justifications supporting its use. If anything, however, the opposite is true.67 It 
is nevertheless possible to identify a dominant theme purporting to justify 
severability’s operation, and that is the theme of “judicial restraint.”68 
This theme encompasses two more specific expressions in the context of 
severability. The first is that severability minimizes the statutory disruption 
caused by a court’s constitutional ruling. The Supreme Court has referred to 
this principle as helping the court “not to nullify more of a legislature’s work 
than is necessary.”69 Justice Stevens has echoed the sentiment in describing 
severability as “limit[ing] judicial power by minimizing the damage done to the 
statute by judicial fiat.”70 
An example of this expression of judicial restraint emerged in Ayotte, a 
case on Supreme Court review after the Court of Appeals had concluded that 
an abortion regulation lacked a constitutionally required health exception.71 
According to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals had erred by 
invalidating the state regulation “in its entirety” without first analyzing 
legislative intent and declaring the statute to be either severable or 
inseverable.72 The Court, in other words, insisted that the Court of Appeals 
employ the dominant severability framework. In justifying this insistence, the 
Court provided what soon would become an oft-cited articulation of why such 
an approach was necessary: it helped “to limit the solution to the problem.”73 
 
 67.  See generally supra Part II.A (describing the reflexive acceptance severability enjoys). 
Perhaps it is the seeming dearth of other options that explains the lack of analysis addressing 
whether severability is the appropriate framework for analysis. See supra notes 55–56 and 
accompanying text. 
 68.  As a court addressing the constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act put it, 
“[s]everability is a doctrine of judicial restraint.” Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012). The judge in this case offered this observation in the course of striking the ACA down in 
its entirety. See also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 303 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part) (discussing, in the context of severability, “the tradition of judicial restraint that has 
heretofore limited our power to overturn validly enacted statutes”); Dorf, supra note 15, at 292. 
 69.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006). 
 70.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). See also id. at 284 (arguing that 
the unusual approach taken by the majority “expands, rather than limits, judicial power”). 
 71.  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330–31. 
 72.  Id. If the Court of Appeals had concluded it was the former, according to the Supreme 
Court, it should have issued “an injunction prohibiting the statute’s unconstitutional 
application.” See id. at 331–32. If the latter, it should have expressly held “that consistency with 
legislative intent requires invalidating the statute in toto.” See id. at 332. 
 73.  Id. at 328; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
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The second theory underlying the judicial-restraint justification is that 
the severability framework, properly understood, helps a court to avoid 
“judicial legislation.”74 Implicit in this theory is the idea that there is a line 
separating certain judicial responses to a statute (“judicial legislation”) from 
other forms (for example, “judicial interpretation” or “judicially fashioned 
remed[ies]”75), and that only the latter set of responses is permissible. 
An example of what nearly every court and scholar likely would deem 
“judicial legislation” might be if the Supreme Court, in response to 
constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act, completely rewrote the 
statute—which is based integrally on the participation of private insurance 
companies—to transform it into a single-payer scheme run entirely by the 
federal government. This would require a drastic and exhaustive overhaul of 
a complex and interrelated statute that runs hundreds of thousands of words 
long,76 and which, to this author’s knowledge, nowhere contains an indication 
that Congress would have preferred a court-created single-payer system over 
the invalidation of the ACA as written.77 An example, by contrast, of what 
nearly every court and scholar likely would deem “judicial interpretation” (or 
“construction”78) as opposed to judicial legislation would be a straightforward, 
uncontroversial conclusion regarding how one of the ACA’s many provisions 
applies to the particular facts of a routine dispute among parties. 
Despite the near ubiquity of this theory of judicial restraint—that is, the 
theory that severability helps to separate “judicial legislation” from the routine 
interpretative work of a court—it suffers from a profound degree of 
imprecision. In large part this is because it is not clear what, exactly, 
distinguishes “judicial interpretation” (or construction) from “judicial 
legislation.”79 Stated otherwise, how does one draw the line between the 
 
508 (2010) (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328–29); Booker, 543 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting 
in part) (“No judicial remedy is proper if it is ‘not commensurate with the constitutional violation 
to be repaired.’” (quoting Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 (1976))). 
 74.  See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995); Vivid 
Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 574 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Because a court may not use 
severability as a fig leaf for judicial legislation, courts have fashioned limits on when a statute may 
be severed.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006) 
(referring favorably to “judicial interpretations” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 87 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to a Bivens 
claim as a “judicially fashioned remedy”); United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 
2010) (referring to the exclusionary rule as a “judicially fashioned remedy”). 
 76.  Read the Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/where-can-
i-read-the-affordable-care-act (last visited May 1, 2016) (containing the full text of the Affordable 
Care Act). 
 77.  For further discussion of this hypothetical, see infra note 270 and accompanying text; 
see also infra note 297. 
 78.  For a helpful discussion of the distinctions between “statutory interpretation” and 
“statutory construction,” see generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 79.  See supra note 78 (addressing distinction between statutory construction and statutory 
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single-payer example cited above, on the one hand, and the routine work of 
a court, on the other? The lack of precision may relate to the level of 
generality adopted in the discussions. While each invocation of this theory of 
judicial restraint seems to provide a slightly different characterization of the 
relevant line, nearly all are stated in very general terms. Usually, the rhetoric 
involves references to text, as courts are accused in a conclusory way of 
“tamper[ing] with the text,”80 “supplement[ing] the text,”81 “drafting 
legislation,”82 or “rewriting” statutes.”83 These are, of course, all metaphors: in 
the American system of judicial review, the courts have no power to change 
statutory text. In response to any judicial ruling, the text remains in the Code, 
exactly the same as before. 
Despite the vagueness characterizing these discussions, courts and 
scholars have offered at least a few attempts, in the context of severability, at 
more precisely drawing the line between impermissible and permissible 
judicial conduct. These attempts tend to adopt one of following three 
substantive approaches, which this Article terms the “Blue Pencil Test,” the 
“Complexity Test,” and the “Primary Drafter Test.” Given the importance of 
these tests in both justifying and defining the severability framework,84 each is 
described below. 
The Blue Pencil Test. The first of these tests—that is, of those purporting 
to provide a guide for determining which of a court’s severability-related 
actions are “legislative” versus “judicial” in nature—will be referred to in this 
Article as the “Blue Pencil Test.” Though an implicit version of this test 
appears occasionally in discussions of severability, it originally derives from 
contract law. In the latter context, it is a judicial standard that permits 
offending words in a contract to be “invalidated” if, and only if, “it would be 
possible to delete [those words] simply by running a blue pencil through 
 
interpretation). Another layer of confusion exists because it is not clear if this theory is meant 
merely to justify severability analysis, or if it is meant to impose an independent bar on what a 
court can do under the guise of severability analysis. In other words, it is not clear if adherents to 
this theory believe that the basic test for severability ensures that a court is not engaged in 
legislative activity—or if they instead believe that while the severability test helps to police this 
line, it occasionally does not, in which case the court still must avoid engaging in so-called judicial 
legislation. The phrasing of certain judicial and academic discussions suggests that the latter 
understanding may be more prevalent. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 
546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (suggesting that severability analysis cannot unfold without an 
independent inquiry into whether a legislature is impermissibly “rely[ing] on [the court’s] 
intervention” to sever the relevant statute). Yet this only leads to more fundamental confusion: if 
a straightforward application of the test for severability occasionally leads to impermissible 
judicial legislation, what is a court supposed to do in that circumstance? No authority appears to 
have provided a clear answer. 
 80.  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478 (1995). 
 81.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 310 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
 82.  Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 83.  Id. at 284. 
 84.  See infra Part III.A. 
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them.”85 This standard deems any other approach to the contractual 
language—including “changing, adding, or rearranging words”—to be 
impermissible.86 Applied in the context of a constitutionally disrupted statute, 
this test has intuitive appeal. Even the expression “severability” (derived from 
“to sever”) is consistent with this idea, as the verb tends to invokes images of 
merely excising parts of a thing, rather than otherwise altering that thing in 
any way. Under the Blue Pencil Test, if the court were to do anything other 
than disregard certain words from a statute, then it would not be engaging in 
severability. In the words of the joint dissent in National Federation, it instead 
would be construing the statute “to say what it does not say,”87 and “[s]uch a 
judicial power would not be called the doctrine of severability but perhaps the 
doctrine of amendatory invalidation.”88 This is one of many examples of the 
Blue Pencil Test appearing in substance, though not necessarily by name, in 
the context of constitutionally disrupted statutes. 
The Complexity Test. A second attempt at drawing this line—between 
judicial responses to constitutionally defective statutes that are either 
legislative or judicial in nature—may be referred to as the “Complexity Test.” 
This is because it suggests that the line in question tracks the complexity or 
creativity of the relevant analysis. To this end, a court will be accused of 
impermissibly acting as a legislature when it responds to a ruling of 
unconstitutionality through “line-drawing [that] is inherently complex,”89 or 
when it construes a statute in a manner that is perceived as “creative,”90 
“imaginative,” 91 or “novel.”92 By contrast, a court tends to avoid such criticism 
when its severability analysis can be considered a “‘relatively simple matter’”93: 
when the court, for example, is merely “invalidat[ing] an application of a 
statute”94 rather than engaging in an “atextual” application.95 It is an 
understanding of the judicial function that resists complexity, creativity, or 
nuance.96 
 
 85.  Blue-pencil test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); cf. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 
1, 27 (2008) (joint opinion of Scalia, Roberts, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (deeming it “not 
unusual for the Court to blue-pencil a statute [by] directing that one of its provisions, severable 
from the rest, be disregarded”). 
 86.  Blue-pencil test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 87.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,132 S. Ct. 2566, 2667 (2012) (joint opinion of 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006). 
 90.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 284 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 93.  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329–30 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 
U.S. 454, 479 n.26 (1995)). 
 94.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 95.  Id. at 2677 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 96.  Professor Fallon has described this phenomenon. See Fallon, supra note 58, at 955 
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This approach appears, in one form or another, with some frequency. It 
is, for example, consistent with the rhetoric the Chief Justice employed in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Oversight Board when he objected to what he 
perceived as a court’s “editorial freedom.”97 Justice Scalia also appeared to 
champion this idea at the National Federation oral argument when he suggested 
the Court should adopt the approach because severability “reduces our 
options the most.”98 In Ayotte, a unanimous court seemed to endorse this idea 
when it asserted that the Court’s “ability to devise a judicial remedy that does 
not entail quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly we 
have already articulated the background constitutional rules at issue and how 
easily we can articulate the remedy.”99 
It is true that this test suffers from a lack of precision and, more 
fundamentally, a lack of theorization.100 It is also possible that this inquiry into 
complexity means to be a proxy for another concern,101 though its role as a 
proxy does not appear to have been expressly articulated. It nevertheless plays 
a recurring role in discussions of severability. 
The Primary Drafter Test. A third attempt at drawing the line between the 
judicial and the legislative spheres looks to the degree to which a court, rather 
than Congress, is determining a constitutionally disrupted statute’s meaning 
or scope. Professor Fallon has offered one of the most lucid articulations of 
this idea. As he has explained, under this theory, “a federal court may sever a 
statute, or impose a limiting construction on one,” only “if the particular 
subrules that a court would need to specify to ‘save’ part of a statute would . . . 
sufficiently reflect the structure and history of the statute to be attributed to 
Congress, rather than the court.”102 
This Article has termed this test the “Primary Drafter Test” because it 
seeks to differentiate between, on the one hand, statutes that “the legislature 
 
(“[W]hen substantial severing would be necessary to save a statute from invalidity, the Court will 
[deem the statute severable] if it can identify a relatively surgically precise way of curing the defect 
that an applicable test has identified . . . but not otherwise.”); id. at 956 (“Crucially, however—
and contrary to the usual understanding of the presumption of severability—the Court ordinarily 
will not [deem a statute severable] when the statute would require relatively substantial severing 
in order to survive unless it can foresee reasonably precise lines along which severance could 
occur.”). Eric Fish provides an insightful description of the intuitions that underlie this approach 
in his analysis of what he refers to as “constitutional remedies.” See Eric S. Fish, Choosing 
Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 322, 339 (2016). 
 97.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010). 
 98.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (No. 11-393). 
 99.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006). 
 100.  See infra notes 251–69 and accompanying text. 
 101.  See infra notes 270–74 and accompanying text (discussing the Primary Drafter Test, for 
which the Complexity Test may be intended to be a proxy). 
 102.  Fallon, supra note 24, at 1333–34. If this criterion is met, then the statute can be 
considered “readily susceptible to such a construction” and therefore on the proper side of “the 
vague line that divides judicial interpretation from judicial legislation.” Id. at 1333. 
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actually adopted,”103 even if they reflect some relatively minor judicial 
modification, and on the other, statutes so severely affected by judicially 
modification that, in effect, “Congress did not write” them.104 
Although the Primary Drafter Test remains “vague,” as Professor Fallon 
has acknowledged,105 it is nevertheless more analytically sophisticated than 
the other two tests. Indeed, it may even help to explain the other two tests. In 
other words, it is possible that either or both of the Blue Pencil Test and the 
Complexity Test are meant to serve as proxies for the Primary Drafter Test—
that is, as proxies for ensuring that Congress remains the primary drafter of a 
given statute. 
As the latter observation indicates, the three identified tests are not 
exclusive, but rather may overlap or be considered together. One might 
conclude, for example, that a court engaging in severability avoids judicial 
legislation only if it satisfies both the Complexity Test and the Primary Drafter 
Test. Moreover, these three tests are not the only possible tests.106 They 
nevertheless do appear to be the most prevalent. 
Whatever the particular taxonomy, articulation of these tests helps to 
explain why severability has garnered such widespread acceptance and use. It 
at least purports to ensure that the courts limit their activity to judicial work, 
thereby avoiding encroachment on “the legislative domain.”107 Yet, as this 
Article will explain, severability’s promise of judicial restraint cannot 
withstand closer analysis. The doctrine not only fails to accomplish its own 
intended purposes; it undermines them.108 
II. SEVERABILITY AS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE 
Severability purports to protect statutes. Yet as it is employed it 
undermines them. As this Part explains, the severability framework prohibits 
courts from employing a range of otherwise permissible analytical approaches 
when they are responding to constitutionally disrupted statutes. These 
restrictions directly interfere with the effectuation of legislative intent. 
Despite the widespread acceptance of the severability framework, neither 
courts nor scholars have acknowledged this destructive dynamic, much less 
explained how it can be justified. Nor have either courts or scholars addressed 
 
 103.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 292 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) 
(quoting Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973)). 
 104.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012) (joint opinion of 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 105.  Fallon, supra note 24, at 1333–34. 
 106.  See, e.g., infra notes 274–82 and accompanying text (discussing a line possibly based on 
the institutional competence of the court); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (joint 
opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (suggesting that a court engages 
in judicial legislation if its severability analysis is “automatic or too cursory”). 
 107.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (quoting 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 n.26 (1995)). 
 108.  See infra Part III.A. 
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a related analytical concern: why the analytical approaches in question are 
impermissible in the context of severability but permissible in other areas of 
the law. 
The troubling effects that emerge from this regime include doctrinal 
confusion, disregard of legislative intent, and a sweeping invalidation of 
swaths of the U.S. Code. Moreover, severability may be headed down an even 
more destructive path: toward a stricter form of severability, with effects that 
are even more disruptive of Congress’s work. 
A.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT: AN UNACKNOWLEDGED CASUALTY OF SEVERABILITY’S 
RESTRICTIVE FRAMEWORK 
Neither courts nor scholars have acknowledged severability’s subtly 
destructive effect on legislation. More specifically, the severability framework 
responds to the problem of constitutionally disrupted statutes by limiting 
courts’ options, which in turn undermines their ability to follow legislative 
intent. 
These limitations arise because “severability,” as generally understood, 
sets forth a restrictive framework that provides a court with only two options: 
invalidate a constitutionally disrupted statute’s unconstitutional portions, or 
invalidate that statute in full. So defined, this framework does not permit a 
court to employ such alternative responses as: (1) construing a 
constitutionally disrupted statute in a way that expands its reach;  
(2) disregarding (or otherwise altering) a portion of the statute that is not 
considered to be the most immediate source of the unconstitutionality; or  
(3) treating some portion of the statute as having a nonstandard meaning. 
And this is not all. Recently, jurists and commentators have set forth an 
even more severe form of severability, one that imposes even more drastic 
limitations on courts. These limitations forbid courts from: (4) construing or 
applying a statute in a way that gives the court too much “editorial freedom”; 
or (5) engaging in so-called “application severability,” a well-established form 
of severability that invalidates certain statutory applications in a manner that 
does not track the text.109 Each of these five approaches is prohibited (or, at 
least, threatened) once a court decides to proceed through the framework of 
severability. To illustrate how this approach restricts courts’ ability to 
effectuate legislative intent—that is, to illustrate how severability narrows the 
courts’ options, even when legislative intent directs otherwise—this Part 
explores each of the five imperiled approaches in turn. 
1. Construing a statute in a way that expands its reach 
Severability, as commonly understood, does not permit a court to treat a 
constitutionally disrupted statute as having an expanded reach, even if that 
 
 109.  See infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text for a more thorough definition of 
application severability. 
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approach would cure the unconstitutionality. Imagine, for example, a statute 
that is unconstitutionally underinclusive. Perhaps a statutory scheme provides 
benefits to families in response to the unemployment of the father but denies 
those same benefits in the case of unemployment of the mother.110 The court 
may conclude that this discriminatory treatment of parents runs afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause.111 If the court then responds to the constitutional 
disruption through the framework of “severability,” it has two only options: it 
can disregard the entire statute, or it can disregard its unconstitutional 
portion. The severability framework does not permit the court to take a third 
path—for example, to construe the employment-related statute as granting 
benefits to families with an unemployed father or mother. 
This is because “severability,” as generally understood, “may proceed ‘by 
striking out or disregarding words [or applications] that are in the 
[challenged] section,’” but “it may not proceed ‘by inserting [applications] 
that are not now there.’”112 
To the extent courts or commentators even have attempted to justify this 
limitation on the courts, they have done so through conclusory appeals to 
judicial restraint—by asserting, for example, that a contrary approach “would 
constitute legislation beyond [the Court’s] judicial power.”113 In so doing, 
however, they have offered no explanation for why this same judicial response 
may be permissible in other legal contexts, such as in the context of 
“remedy.”114 A classic case illustrating the latter is Califano v. Westcott, which 
provides the inspiration for the hypothetical discussed above.115 In Califano, 
the Court declared unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that 
provided aid to families with an unemployed father, but not, all else being 
equal, to those with an unemployed mother.116 
In discussing the appropriate remedy, the Court explained that two 
alternatives exist for underinclusive statutes: “a court may either declare [the 
statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the 
legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to 
 
 110.  A timely variation on this example might involve a law granting benefits to parents of 
the opposite sex, but not to parents of the same sex. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (holding that same-sex couples cannot be deprived of fundamental right to marry). 
 111.  This hypothetical is taken from Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), which is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 112.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 325 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) 
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  For a discussion regarding whether severability analysis itself should be considered a 
question of remedy, see supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 115.  Califano, 443 U.S. at 89–91; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 116.  Id. at 89. 
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include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.”117 Indeed, in such a case, 
“extension, rather than nullification, is the proper course.”118 
Yet such an approach, which is “proper” as a remedy,119 is prohibited in 
the context of severability. Neither the case law nor the commentary has 
attempted to explain this discrepancy. Nor has either provided an answer to 
an even more fundamental question: why, in the context of severability, is it 
permissible for a court to reject such a response if that is what the legislature 
would have intended? The received view of severability provides no 
explanation. 
2.  Disregarding (or otherwise altering) a portion of the statute that is not 
considered to be the most immediate source of the unconstitutionality 
A second approach prohibited in the context of severability is the courts’ 
acceptance of what are, in a sense, “substitute” statutory provisions.120 One 
manifestation of this approach, if it were permitted, would allow a court to go 
beyond what it considers to be the most immediate source of a statute’s 
unconstitutionality and, in so doing, “invalidate any part or parts of a statute 
(and add others)” to cure the constitutional defect.121 This approach 
theoretically is implicated every time a statute is unconstitutional with respect 
to certain statutory portions, but would remain within constitutional bounds 
if a court were to disregard or otherwise alter some separate set of statutory 
portions. 
It is true that this distinction (between the most immediate source of a 
statute’s unconstitutionality and some other implicated portion) is vague and 
problematic. This Article does not defend the distinction as conceptually 
sound. It nevertheless exists in the doctrine. To illustrate the phenomenon, 
the prime example (or, perhaps more precisely, the exception that proves the 
rule) is the Sentencing Reform Act challenged in United States v. Booker.122 In 
conjunction with the promulgated guidelines, this Act required courts to 
sentence defendants based on facts found not by a jury. As applied to a subset 
of defendants—that is, those receiving sentences higher than they otherwise 
 
 117.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970)). 
 118.  Id. It is true that remedies of this sort may have been more common prior to the Roberts 
Court. Yet precedents such as Califano remain good law, with Justices continuing to rely on the 
underlying remedial principles. See, e.g., Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 427 
(2010). In any event, a shift in frequency does not explain the continued discrepancy in the 
doctrine: namely, that what is permissible in the “remedy” framework is impermissible in the 
“severability” framework. 
 119.  See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding whether legal 
scholars should consider the severability analysis as a question of remedy. 
 120.  This language is inspired by Professor Dorf’s use of the term in the context of what he 
refers to as fallback law. See Dorf, supra note 56, at 305. 
 121.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 282 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 322 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
 122.  Id. 
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could have received—this regime violated the Sixth Amendment. As a result, 
the Court (as is so often the case) turned to severability. 
Under the prevailing severability framework, the Court was permitted 
two options: it could disregard this particular subset of statutorily applications 
(that is, it could vacate the sentences of those who had been subject to the 
higher sentences, and not allow any such sentencing going forward), or it 
could disregard all statutory applications (that is, it could vacate all the 
sentences calculated under the Act and not allow the Act to dictate any 
sentences going forward). What was not available to the Court, under the 
prevailing conception of severability, was a third approach: that is, choosing 
to disregard a separate provision in the Act, even though it did not consider 
that separate provision to be the immediate source of the 
unconstitutionality.123 
Ironically, a fractured majority in Booker actually did take this third 
approach. Over the vigorous dissent of four Justices, the Court decided it 
would disregard the separate provision of the Act: the provision making the 
Guidelines mandatory rather than advisory.124 This cured the statute’s 
unconstitutionality by ensuring that all necessary facts would be found by the 
jury. In adopting this approach, however, the Court accepted a framework for 
severability that is inconsistent with virtually every articulation that the Court 
has set forth before or since. 
Tellingly, Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion on the 
substantive constitutional claim but dissented with respect to severability, 
refused to accept that the Court had engaged in “severability analysis” at all.125 
Rather, he accused the majority of adopting “entirely new law”126 through “a 
novel and questionable method of invalidating statutory provisions,” which in 
his mind amounted to “a wholesale rewriting” of the statute.127 Justice 
Thomas, in a separate dissent, “agree[d] with [Justice Stevens] that [the 
majority opinion] grossly distorts severability analysis by using severability 
principles to determine which provisions the Court should strike as 
unconstitutional.”128 
In at least one respect, the dissents won this argument: notwithstanding 
the majority’s attempt to summon supporting precedent,129 Booker’s 
articulation of the severability framework—which, as a preview, this Article 
 
 123.  Id. at 246 (plurality opinion) (describing the third approach). 
 124.  Id. at 246–49 (summarizing conclusions). 
 125.  Id. at 281–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Scholars have echoed this understanding 
of what occurred in Booker. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 56, at 306 (“Although nominally using the 
language of severability, the Court in effect substituted advisory for mandatory Guidelines.”). 
 126.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 127.  Id. at 284. 
 128.  Id. at 322 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
 129.  Id. at 247. 
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ultimately will defend130—does appear to constitute a stark anomaly in the 
case law.131 It is in this sense that Booker constitutes the exception that proves 
the “rule”132: that is, that the severability framework only permits one of two 
narrow responses. As such, it does not allow a court to invalidate just any 
portion of a statute in a more creative effort to cure constitutional defects. 
Yet outside the context of severability, courts feel empowered to respond 
to a statute’s constitutional disruption by adopting substitute provisions. 
Often couched as a “remedy,”133 such a result can adhere even when it 
requires altering statutory portions other than those considered to be the 
most immediate cause of the statute’s unconstitutionality. In the context of 
redistricting, for example, courts regularly reject district lines drawn by 
statute, in light of some constitutional flaw, before redrawing those lines 
themselves.134 And courts openly acknowledge their acceptance of 
“substitute” provisions so long as those provisions are contained explicitly in 
a statute.135 
The Court in Bowsher v. Synar, for example, declared unconstitutional the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act before ordering, as a 
“remedy,” that substitute provisions be enforced.136 Referring to these 
substitute provisions—which were express provisions enacted by Congress—
as “fallback provisions,”137 the Court took pains to clarify that, by effectuating 
these provisions, it was not engaging in severability analysis. Characterizing 
itself as refusing to “perform the type of creative and imaginative statutory 
surgery urged by appellants” (who had been urging the Court to “sever” only 
 
 130.  Id. at 322 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part); see also infra Part III.B for a defense of 
this approach. 
 131.  Justice Stevens appeared accurately to describe the precedents, in other words, when 
he asserted that: 
There is no case of which I am aware . . . in which this Court has used 
‘severability’ analysis to do what the majority does today: determine that some 
unconstitutional applications of a statute, when viewed in light of the Court’s    
reading of ‘likely’ legislative intent, justifies the invalidation of certain 
statutory sections in their entirety, their constitutionality notwithstanding, in 
order to save the parts of the statute the Court deemed most important. 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 132.  Id. at 280–81 (“Our normal rule, however, is that the ‘unconstitutionality of a part of an 
Act does not necessarily defeat or affect the validity of its remaining provisions. Unless it is evident 
that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, 
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully 
operative.’” (first emphasis added)). 
 133.  See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See Lisa Marshall Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of Democratic Design, 
93 B.U. L. Rev. 563, 566 (2013). In so doing, redistricting courts very well may alter district lines 
beyond those that may be considered to be the most immediate cause of the unconstitutionality. 
 135.  For the relationship between courts and explicit substitute provisions, see generally 
Dorf, supra note 56. 
 136.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734–36 (1986). 
 137.  Id. at 735–36. 
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a small portion of the statute), the Court explained that severability was a 
“thicket we need not enter,” given the existence of the so-called fallback 
provisions.138 Freed of the limiting effects of the severability framework, in 
other words, the Court was able to “simply permit[] the fallback provisions to 
come into play.”139 At no point did the Court explain why, once in the 
“thicket” of severability, it would have been impermissible to turn to substitute 
provisions. 
Nor, of course, did the Court address the same, fundamental question 
identified above: why impose such limitations if the legislature would have 
preferred otherwise? If the answer boils down to whether the substitute 
provisions are explicit or not (a response that nevertheless fails to address the 
redistricting example), that merely modifies the question: why must a court 
disregard legislative intent whenever the legislature has failed to make its 
substitute provisions explicit? Neither case law nor the commentary has 
attempted to provide an explanation. 
3.  Treating some portion of the statute as having a nonstandard meaning 
Another approach a court might take, in response to a ruling of 
unconstitutionality, is to treat some offending portion of a statute as having a 
nonstandard meaning—that is, a meaning that the court would not have 
found in the absence of the constitutional disruption. In other words, a court 
might construe a statute to have a meaning curative of the unconstitutionality, 
even if it would not have adopted such a meaning without the constitutional 
disruption. 
This is, essentially, what Chief Justice Roberts did in the National 
Federation case with respect to the litigants’ broad (and ultimately 
unsuccessful) challenge to the ACA’s individual mandate. The Chief began 
by concluding that “[t]he most straightforward reading of the [ACA] mandate 
is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance” but that such a reading 
would produce an unconstitutional result.140 Had the Chief then engaged in 
traditional severability analysis, he would have been required to disregard the 
ACA either in whole or in part. Instead, however, the Chief asked a different 
question: “whether the Government’s alternative reading of the statute—that 
it only imposes a tax on those without insurance—is a reasonable one.”141 He 
concluded this alternative reading was, indeed, reasonable and, citing 
doctrines of constitutional avoidance, adopted that alternative reading. In so 
doing, the Chief strongly implied that he would not have adopted this reading 
had he not first reached a ruling of unconstitutionality.142 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 736. 
 140.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 141.  Id. at 2593. 
 142.  See id. at 2593–94. 
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The dissent, disagreeing strongly with the Chief’s alternate reading, 
argued that construing the mandate as a tax did “violence to the fair meaning 
of the words used.”143 Yet had the Chief, having concluded that the Act was 
unconstitutional under its most natural reading, then resorted to 
“severability” analysis (rather than familiar canons of constitutional 
avoidance), the dissent would have had a much more forceful objection. For 
under no commonly held understanding of severability is a court permitted 
to adopt a nonstandard construction of a statute it has deemed to be 
constitutionally disrupted. 
Outside the framework of severability, however, courts routinely assign 
statutes nonstandard meanings in response to constitutional concerns. This 
approach is so common, in fact, that it has risen to the level of a well-
established canon of statutory interpretation—perhaps the “preeminent 
canon.”144 This is the canon of constitutional avoidance.145 Despite this 
pedigree, the analytical approach that underlies the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance—that is, its reliance on nonstandard meanings—is prohibited once 
a court concludes that “severability” applies. Again, the courts police this 
prohibition without explanation either for the discrepancy or for the 
interference with legislative intent. 
4.  Construing or applying the statute in a way that gives the court too 
much “editorial freedom” 
Each of the first three limitations—relating to the expansion of 
applications, the altering of statutory portions that are not considered to be 
the most immediate source of the unconstitutionality, and the reliance on 
nonstandard constructions—are well established in the context of severability. 
Yet there appears to be a movement afoot; the list appears to be expanding. 
Recently, courts and commentators have advanced an even more restrictive 
form of severability—one that imposes additional limitations on the courts by 
relying on similarly vague concerns over judicial restraint. One of these newer 
 
 143.  Id. at 2651 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(quoting Grenada Cty. Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 269 (1884)). 
 144.  Vermeule, supra note 58, at 1948. 
 145.  In its modern form, the canon of constitutional avoidance states that “where an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the 
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary 
to the intent of Congress.” Id. at 1949 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). It is, of course, true that this canon 
requires a court to consider and, as appropriate, to accept alternate constructions of a statute 
prior to any formal finding of unconstitutionality. Id. at 1959. Severability analysis, by contrast, 
normally occurs after the finding of constitutionality. As a result, the court’s refusal to engage in 
this sort of analysis in the context of severability is unlikely to make a difference in any given case, 
given that any constitutionally curative nonstandard construction presumably already has been 
considered and rejected. It nevertheless provides even further support for the more general 
point: in the context of severability, courts and commentators dismiss otherwise-accepted 
analytical approaches as existing outside the judicial sphere. 
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restrictions seeks to limit how much discretion a court can exercise when 
determining which portions of a given statute should be disregarded. Hostility 
with a court’s discretion in this context overlaps quite a bit with the 
“Complexity Test” described above, as both track an insistence that a court’s 
severability determinations somehow remain uncomplicated or even 
mechanical in nature. 
The Court recently illustrated its resistance to discretion and complexity 
in the previously discussed Free Enterprise Fund.146 In this case, the Supreme 
Court concluded that a combination of statutory provisions violated the 
Constitution’s separation-of-powers principles. The Court then considered 
how the statute should apply going forward. Concluding that certain 
provisions (those associated with “good-cause removal”) were “severable from 
the remainder of the statute,” the Court held that those provisions would no 
longer be given effect.147 It then discussed the possibility of the statute 
applying in some other way. It explained: 
It is true that the language providing for good-cause removal is only 
one of a number of statutory provisions that, working together, 
produce a constitutional violation. In theory, perhaps, the Court 
might blue-pencil a sufficient number of the Board’s responsibilities 
so that [the constitutional problem would be resolved]. Or we could 
restrict the Board’s enforcement powers, so that [the constitutional 
problem would be resolved]. Or the Board members could in future 
be made removable by the President, for good cause or at will[, 
thereby satisfying the relevant constitutional requirements]. But such 
editorial freedom—far more extensive than our holding today—belongs to the 
Legislature, not the Judiciary.148 
As this passage makes clear, the Court is rejecting the latter options not 
based on any conclusion about legislative intent, but rather because of its 
conclusion that their adoption would have given the Court too much freedom 
in deciding how the statute should operate going forward. (Presumably this 
would include freedom to decide, for example, which of the Board’s 
responsibilities or enforcement powers should be “blue-pencil[ed].”) 
Importantly, the Court did not reject these options because it had concluded 
that their adoption would have been different in nature from adopting the 
option it did take. Stated otherwise, the Court did not reject these options 
because it considered them different in nature from the two approaches 
normally permitted in the context of severability (disregarding the statute in 
 
 146.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510–13 (2010). 
 147.  Id. at 508–09. 
 148.  Id. at 509–10 (emphasis added). 
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part, or disregarding it in whole).149 Instead, the problem came down to an 
excess of discretion.150 
Taken at face value, this limitation—a rejection of any severability 
analysis that accords the court too much “freedom” or too many 
“options”151—is troubling. While some jurists and scholars have expressed 
skepticism toward courts engaging in any sort of complicated legal analysis 
(and this skepticism tends to be part of an overarching judicial philosophy 
that seeks more generally to resist creativity in judicial analysis),152 even the 
most aggressive of skeptics does not go so far as to suggest that analytical 
complexity, on its own, constitutes judicial error. Justice Thomas, for 
example, acknowledges that intricate statutes often will require a court to 
engage in complicated analysis and that it is proper to do so.153 And even 
Justice Scalia had agreed that one of the most creative (and, as such, 
controversial) forms of judicial analysis—that is, federal common law 
making—is appropriate in certain circumstances, including when a statute 
directs a court to engage in it.154 So even for those who are quick to question 
any perceived creativity or complexity in judicial analysis, it is far from self-
evident why creativity or complexity, without more, should be prohibited—
 
 149.  To the contrary, by referring to one of the approaches as “blue-pencil[ing,]” the Court 
appears to be acknowledging that such a step would constitute nothing more than disregarding 
a statute in part, which was the same approach it did take with respect to the language providing 
for good-cause removal. Id. at 509. 
 150.  This same sentiment has been echoed recently in other contexts, as when Justice Scalia, 
during oral argument for National Federation, suggested the Court should adopt whatever 
approach to severability “reduces our options the most.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393). See also, e.g., Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329–30 (2006). 
 151.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (No. 11-393). 
 152.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS xxii (2012) (“[T]he more the interpretive process strays outside a law’s text, the 
greater the interpreter’s discretion.”); A Conversation on the Constitution: Perspectives from 
Active Liberty and a Matter of Interpretation, Justices Breyer and Scalia Converse on the Constitution, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.acslaw.org/news/video/justices-breyer-and-scalia-
converse-on-the-constitution; Dahlia Lithwick, Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar, SLATE (Dec. 6, 
2006 4:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/12/ 
justice_grover_versus_justice_oscar.html (summarizing debate over judicial methods with the 
following description: “[f]or each time Breyer says his own constitutional approach is 
‘complicated’ or ‘hard,’ Scalia retorts that his is ‘easy as pie’ and a ‘piece of cake’”). 
 153.  See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 676 (2003) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority’s analysis of the Medicaid Act on the 
ground that the analysis “ignore[d] [the] complexity” of the complicated statute). 
 154.  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 
20–21 (2015) (“In Justice Scalia’s words, a court that articulated this sort of federal common law 
would be exercising ‘substantive lawmaking power,’ and federal courts enjoy such power only to 
the extent that something in written federal law delegates it to them.” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 742 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment))). 
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whether or not in the context of severability. Nor is any answer evident in 
response to the more fundamental question again posed by this limitation: 
with respect to a statute reflecting contrary legislative intent—that is, intent 
that a court respond to a statute’s constitutional disruption with complicated, 
innovative, or creative forms of analysis—why is it permissible for the court to 
disregard the will of Congress? No answer is evident. Yet this limitation 
continues to gain traction in the doctrine. 
5.  Engaging in “application severability” 
This Article has saved what very well may be the most drastic and 
disruptive limitation for last. Recently, jurists and commentators have 
expressed anxiety over the use of what, for decades, has been relied on largely 
without controversy: so-called “application severability.” 
For background, traditional severability analysis can be broken down into 
two subsets: “text severability” and “application severability.”155 “Text 
severability” occurs when courts “sever [a statute’s] problematic portions 
while leaving the remainder intact.”156 “Application severability,” by contrast, 
occurs when courts “enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute 
while leaving other applications in force.”157 
A hypothetical example helps to illustrate. A newly enacted statute 
provides that “any person convicted of murder shall be incarcerated for thirty 
years.”158 The question then becomes: does this statute apply to those who 
already have been convicted and already have served a sentence of less than 
thirty years?159 “If so, a serious question of constitutionality arises under the 
Ex Post Facto Clauses,” and the court will “rule[] the statute unconstitutional 
as applied to those already convicted but constitutional as applied to future 
convictions.”160 In other words, the court will sever the unconstitutional 
applications from the constitutional ones, and refuse to enforce the former. 
So described, application severability may seem unremarkable. “It is 
axiomatic that a ‘statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet 
valid as applied to another,’”161 and courts engage in this sort of line-drawing 
 
 155.  See Metzger, supra note 58, at 886; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (“The severability issue may arise when a court strikes 
either a provision of a statute or an application of a provision. These forms of less-than-total 
invalidation are typically (if awkwardly) referred to as ‘application severability’ and ‘provision 
severability’ respectively.”). 
 156.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 157.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 158.  This hypothetical is adopted from Professor Vermeule’s use of the same. Vermeule, 
supra note 58, at 1955. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (quoting Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 
282, 289 (1921)). 
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all the time.162 And, indeed, there is substantial doctrinal and academic 
authority in support of the propriety of application severability. The Supreme 
Court repeatedly “has acknowledged the severability of applications in 
striking down some applications of a statute while leaving others standing.”163 
Or, as Professor Dorf has explained, “the formal tests [for severability] treat 
applications as no less severable than provisions.”164 
Yet, as Professor Dorf himself acknowledged in 2007, this particular form 
of severability nevertheless leads to significant judicial anxiety. “[J]udges and 
Justices find application severability more troubling in practice [than text 
severability],” he explains, “because it can require them to craft substantive 
provisions where the legislature has crafted none.”165 
Since the publication of Professor Dorf’s article, both the rhetoric and 
the doctrine appear to have become even more hostile to application 
severability. In National Federation, for example, the dissent aggressively 
attacked the legitimacy of the majority’s decision to apply a straightforward 
form of application severability.166 The dissent’s criticism was so forceful—
and, given the generally well-established use of application severability, 
therefore so startling—that it is worth providing a brief summary of the 
constitutional defect. In this case, a majority of Justices had found a violation 
of the Spending Clause arising out of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, which 
grants federal funding for States that provide certain types of health care. The 
constitutional violation arose because the Medicaid expansion had 
implications for an already existing statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. 
The latter provision granted the federal government authority to withhold 
Medicaid payments from a state determined to be out of compliance with any 
Medicaid requirement. As a result of the interaction between the ACA and  
§ 1396c, the federal government became empowered to withhold all 
Medicaid funding from any state refusing to comply with the obligations of 
the new Medicaid expansion. Concluding that this newly created financial 
threat amounted to coercion, the Court concluded it was unconstitutional.167 
This constitutional flaw presented the Court with a difficult problem: 
how should the ACA apply going forward? It is worth noting that the Court 
 
 162.  See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 321–22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
in part) (discussing the use of application severability, both explicit and implicit, in Supreme 
Court case law). 
 163.  Id. at 321. 
 164.  Dorf, supra note 56, at 313 n.32. 
 165.  Id. In support of this observation, Professor Dorf cites Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
Northern New England, a case in which the Court “warned . . . in the context of application 
severability” that a concern over “limited ‘institutional competence’ leads the Justices to ‘restrain’ 
themselves ‘from [rewriting] state law to conform it to constitutional requirements[] even as 
[they] strive to salvage it.’” See id. at 311–12 (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329). 
 166.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2667–71 (2012) (joint opinion 
of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 167.  Id. at 2604–07 (plurality opinion). 
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could not easily engage in “text severability.” While a simple refusal to follow 
§ 1396c indeed would have solved the constitutional problem, that approach 
would significantly disrupt the entire Medicaid program, including any 
number of provisions that (like § 1396c itself) had been enacted well prior to 
the ACA. The majority therefore did not engage in text severability. Instead, 
the majority disregarded a particular subset of the ACA’s applications—i.e., it 
engaged in application severability. As the Chief Justice explained, “[i]n light 
of the Court’s holding, the Secretary cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw 
existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in 
the expansion.”168 
This response to a constitutionally disrupted statute was unremarkable—
except for the response it provoked. The dissent excoriated the majority for 
this decision. In so doing, it made clear that, with respect to the Medicaid 
issue, it was not the Court’s substantive holding, but rather its reading of the 
constitutionally disrupted ACA, that it found objectionable. The dissent 
asserted that: 
The Court today decides to save a statute Congress did not write. . . . 
[I]t changes the intentionally coercive sanction of a total cut-off of 
Medicaid funds to a supposedly noncoercive cut-off of only the 
incremental funds that the Act makes available. 
The Court regards its strained statutory interpretation as judicial 
modesty. It is not. It amounts instead to a vast judicial 
overreaching.169 
The dissent made clear, moreover, that it considered the majority’s 
treatment of the statute to lie outside what “severability” will allow. It 
presented this argument as follows: 
The Government cites a severability clause codified with 
Medicaid . . . . But that clause tells us only that other provisions in 
Chapter 7 should not be invalidated if § 1396c, the authorization for 
the cut-off of all Medicaid funds, is unconstitutional. It does not tell 
us that § 1396c can be judicially revised, to say what it does not say. 
Such a judicial power would not be called the doctrine of severability but 
perhaps the doctrine of amendatory invalidation—similar to the 
amendatory veto that permits the Governors of some States to 
reduce the amounts appropriated in legislation. The proof that such 
a power does not exist is the fact that it would not preserve other 
congressional dispositions, but would leave it up to the Court what 
 
 168.  Id. at 2607. In other words, the Court required that, going forward, § 1396c be read 
not to authorize certain applications (i.e., any application by the Secretary that would deprive a 
state of existing funds because it had failed to comply with a certain requirements set by the ACA) 
but nevertheless be read to authorize other applications. 
 169.  Id. at 2676 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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the “validated” legislation will contain. . . . The Court severs nothing, 
but simply revises § 1396c to read as the Court would desire.170 
In short, use of application severability did not shield the majority from 
criticism. To the contrary, the dissent lambasted the majority for engaging in 
precisely what “severability” purports to prevent: judicial legislation. 
National Federation’s criticism of application severability emerged from a 
joint dissent authored by four Justices, including Justice Thomas, who had 
previously authored a spirited defense of application severability.171 In 
another recent, high-profile case, the criticism came from the majority. In the 
previously discussed Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court rejected the use 
of application severability in response to the constitutionally defective 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act.172 In explanation for this rejection, it explained (similar 
to the National Federation dissent) that such an approach “belongs to the 
Legislature, not the Judiciary.”173 
The implications of this seeming nascent trend in the doctrine—that is, 
the trend away from application severability on the grounds that it constitutes 
impermissible judicial legislation—are difficult to overstate. Courts routinely 
enforce only a subset of a statute’s applications while refusing to enforce the 
others. A court does so, for example, whenever it concludes that, on account 
of the Supreme Court’s constitutional ruling in Roper v. Simmons,174 a criminal 
provision may be applied to those who committed the requisite crime when 
eighteen years or older, but not to those who committed the crime when 
under eighteen years old.175 
More broadly, a court demonstrates its willingness to engage in this 
practice—to enforce only a subset of a statute’s applications—whenever it 
concludes that a litigant has failed to establish a successful facial challenge to 
some portion of a statute but nevertheless may be able to prevail on an as-
applied challenge.176 This occurred, for example, in Crawford v. Marion 
County,177 where the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute 
 
 170.  Id. at 2667 (emphasis added). 
 171.  See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 172.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509–10 (2010). 
 173.  Id. at 510. More specifically, the Court rejected the idea that the Court could 
restrict the Board’s enforcement powers (which could be done through application 
severability) to the extent necessary to render it in compliance with the Constitution. 
Importantly, the Court rejects this possibility not because Congress would have preferred 
the approach the Court did take, but rather because, in the Court’s view, application 
severability of this sort would invade the legislative sphere. 
 174.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 175.  See generally id. 
 176.  See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (discussing facial 
challenges); see generally Fallon, supra note 24 (discussing distinctions between facial and as-
applied challenges). 
 177.  Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
A3_MANHEIM (DO NOT DELETE) 7/4/2016  4:26 PM 
1864 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1833 
requiring voters to show photo identification prior to voting.178 Though the 
Court rejected the facial challenge (which would have prohibited the statute 
from taking effect in every possible application), it did leave open for future 
litigation the possibility of as-applied challenges (which, if successful, would 
prohibit the statute from taking effect in certain applications).179 
Far from an outlier approach, as-applied challenges are very well 
established, with ample support suggesting that they are actually preferred to 
facial challenges.180 Ironically, this stated preference for as-applied challenges 
is intended to advance the very same thing that severability is intended to 
promote: “the fundamental principle of judicial restraint.”181 
Yet even this is not all. A willingness to engage in application severability 
can, in a sense, be inferred whenever a court rejects on the merits any 
constitutional challenge brought by a plaintiff.182 This is because the court in 
such a circumstance has not concluded that the statute is constitutional in 
every conceivable application. Rather, it merely has concluded that the 
relevant statute is constitutional as applied to the litigant before the court. It 
is leaving to another day (and another lawsuit) the possibility that it is 
unconstitutional as applied to someone else—and, as such, is implicitly 
acknowledging at least the possibility that the statute constitutionally could be 
enforced in some applications but not others. 
Stated succinctly, a refusal to permit application severability—and to do 
so on the ground that so deviating from the text would constitute an 
impermissible “rewriting [of] the statute”183—threatens not only well-
established and fundamental doctrines in the context of severability, but 
across any number of implicated doctrines.184 Yet the emerging trends in 
severability seem to be headed in precisely this direction—again without 
acknowledging (much less explaining or affirmatively justifying) how this can 
 
 178.  See generally id. 
 179.  Id. at 188–89, 200 (limiting the holding to petitioners’ facial challenge). 
 180.  See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) 
(“Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons.”). But cf. Fallon, Fact and Fiction About Facial 
Challenges, supra note 58 (questioning whether the Supreme Court’s purported resistance to facial 
challenges accurately describes how the Court actually decides its cases). 
 181.  Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450. 
 182.  Professor Dorf, among others, has recognized this connection. See Dorf, supra note 15, 
at 249. 
 183.  Id. In this passage, Professor Dorf does not necessarily criticize this practice on this 
basis; he simply characterizes it as such. 
 184.  As Professor Fallon has recognized, “[i]n the absence of severability, all challenges to 
statutes would necessarily be facial, for a nonseverable statute that was invalid in some cases would 
necessarily be invalid as to all.” Fallon, Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, supra note 58, at 
953. Although Professor Fallon was referring to all forms of severability, the point also holds with 
respect to application severability on its own. In the absence of application severability, all 
challenges to statutes would necessarily be facial—except with respect to those statutes that 
happened to have been drafted in a manner that allows, in response to the particular 
constitutional challenge, for text severability. 
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be reconciled with doctrines outside the context of severability, or with the 
possibility of contrary legislative intent. 
*         *         * 
This Article has identified five approaches to constitutionally disrupted 
statutes that, once subject to the severability framework, become threatened. 
Stated otherwise, as soon as a court accepts that “severability” applies, that 
court risks reversal (or, at a minimum, impassioned criticism) if it employs 
any of the following five approaches: (1) construing a statute in a way that 
expands its reach; (2) disregarding or otherwise altering a portion of the 
statute that is not considered to be the most immediate source of the 
unconstitutionality; (3) treating some portion of the statute as having a 
nonstandard meaning; (4) construing or applying the statute in a way that 
gives the court too much “editorial freedom”; or (5) merely engaging in 
application severability. 
Critically, resistance to these approaches exists even if effectuation of 
legislative intent would require their use. In other words, it does not matter if 
an inquiry into legislative intent reveals that, had Congress known about a 
statute’s constitutional defect, it would have wanted a court to expand the 
reach of that statute, to disregard some separate portion, or otherwise to veer 
outside the severability norm. Severability simply does not permit such an 
outcome. 
It is in this way that the severability framework drastically limits a court’s 
ability to effectuate legislative intent. The prevailing framework for 
severability does not account for the possibility that, had the legislature known 
of a statute’s constitutional flaw, it would not have intended for the court to 
disregard the statute in whole or in part, but instead would have intended for 
the court to take some third path. This analytical conundrum exists in the 
background every time the court engages in severability. This is no surface-
level problem. It instead results predictably from the combination of 
severability’s two defining features: first, its requirement that the court follow 
legislative intent, and, second, its requirement that, regardless of legislative 
intent, the court may only take only one of two narrow approaches.185 
As indicated above, there is virtually no acknowledgment, much less 
analysis or critical scrutiny, of this central tension embedded in the 
severability framework.186 The unanimous Ayotte provides a vivid illustration 
of how this serious tension is simply glossed over: 
After finding an application or portion of a statute unconstitutional, 
we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left 
of its statute to no statute at all? . . . All the while, we are wary of 
legislatures who would rely on our intervention, for “[i]t would 
certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch 
 
 185.  See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 186.  See supra Part III.A. 
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all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside” to announce to 
whom the statute may be applied. “This would, to some extent, substitute 
the judicial for the legislative department of the government.”187 
This startling juxtaposition—the Court’s endorsement of legislative 
intent followed immediately by an indication that a court should at times 
refuse to follow legislative intent—is presented without acknowledgement or 
explanation. 
Once severability’s problems are revealed, the tensions grow even more 
strained. There is, for one, no answer to the question of what a court should 
do if it determines that the legislature’s preference reflects an impermissible 
“rel[iance] on [the Court’s] intervention.”188 Presumably the court should, 
contrary to legislative intent, insist on invalidating the entire statute. Yet one 
of severability’s central purposes is “not to nullify more of a legislature’s work 
than is necessary.”189 
Nor is there any answer to the question of why a court may, on its own 
accord, reject legislative intent once it determines that the legislature has 
somehow “rel[ied] on [its] intervention.”190 Such a scenario is particularly 
startlingly not only in light of severability’s purported interests in “limiting 
judicial power by minimizing the damage done to the statute by judicial 
fiat,”191 but also in light of its insistence that legislation be dictated by 
Congress, not by the courts. A court is, in a sense, accomplishing precisely the 
opposite (i.e., it is allowing legislation to be dictated by the courts, not 
Congress) when it rejects legislative intent in order to engage in severability 
analysis.192 
These contradictions (at best, tensions) exist without acknowledgment 
or explanation. Yet they do not exist without consequence. Yet as Part III.B 
reveals, these subtle limitations have profound effects. 
B.  STATUTORY DAMAGE: HOW SEVERABILITY’S DISREGARD OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
WREAKS HAVOC ON THE LAW 
The limitations imposed by the severability framework have drastic effects 
on constitutionally disrupted statutes. At the outset, they result in deep 
doctrinal confusion, as illustrated by the previously discussed passage in 
Ayotte.193 By simultaneously endorsing and resisting a court’s inquiry into 
legislative intent, the Court in Ayotte tacitly acknowledged the tension 
 
 187.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)). 
 188.  Id. at 330. 
 189.  Id. at 329. 
 190.  Id. at 330. 
 191.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 282 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 192.  See infra Part III.A (addressing these tensions in greater detail). 
 193.  See supra notes 187–92 and accompanying text. 
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inherent in that combination—but, as usual, it failed to provide any means by 
which to resolve it. Such undertheorized complexity contributes to the 
muddled and constantly shifting rules governing severability analysis.194 It also 
provides a troubling illustration of what Eric Berger has termed “stealth 
constitutional decision making,”195 a phenomenon characterized by 
“unpredictability, imprecision, and opacity” with corrosive effects on the case 
law.196 
Yet the effects run still deeper. By preventing courts from effectuating 
legislative intent, these limitations result in greater statutory invalidation than 
Congress would have preferred. Three doctrinally prominent examples—
involving the Voting Rights Act, the legislative veto, and the Sentencing 
Reform Act—help to illustrate this phenomenon, though this list is far from 
exhaustive. This dismantling of Congress’s work becomes even more startling, 
moreover, when one considers where the doctrine may be headed. Emerging 
trends in severability threaten to demolish wide swaths of the U.S. Code. 
The recent dismantling of the Voting Rights Act provides one illustration 
of severability’s effects. A brief description of this blockbuster case—and the 
landmark piece of legislation it shattered—provides the relevant context. In 
Shelby County v. Holder, the majority invalidated section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act.197 Yet section 4(b), as relevant, did not itself impose any 
substantive mandate. Rather, it provided the “coverage” formula for section 
5, which in turn required covered jurisdictions to receive permission from the 
federal government prior to enforcing any voting-related changes. The 
combination of section 4(b) and section 5, as a result, subjected certain state 
and local jurisdictions to federal oversight of voting practices. So designed, 
the effects of this statute were extraordinary: the combination of sections 4(b) 
and 5 was a central reason why many consider the Voting Rights Act to be the 
“most successful piece of civil rights legislation ever enacted.”198 
The Shelby County majority concluded that section 4(b) was 
unconstitutional because its coverage formula failed to take “current 
conditions” into adequate account.199 Responding to the majority’s 
conclusion that section 4(b) must fall in its entirety, the dissent wondered why 
principles of severability would not allow the majority to keep some section 
4(b) jurisdictions covered—and therefore keep section 5 at least partially in 
force. In the words of Justice Ginsburg, “even if the VRA could not 
 
 194.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also supra note 57. 
 195.  Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 465, 471 (2013). 
 196.  Id. at 532. 
 197.  See generally Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 198.  Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 119–21 (1975) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, 
Exec. Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law). 
 199.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629. 
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constitutionally be applied to certain States—e.g., Arizona and Alaska—[its 
severability provision] calls for those unconstitutional applications to be 
severed, leaving the Act in place for jurisdictions as to which its application 
does not transgress constitutional limits.”200 The majority’s response to this 
severability-based argument was curt. Essentially, it stated that it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to respond in such a manner to a constitutionally 
disrupted statute.201 
The majority’s response was consistent with the doctrinally dominant 
view of severability—and certainly with the more restrictive view of severability 
that has been emerging in the doctrine.202 What the majority’s response 
appears not to have been consistent with, however, is legislative intent.203 
Tellingly, the majority did not argue otherwise. Were severability employed in 
a manner more consistent with legislative intent (and therefore less consistent 
with severability’s restrictive framework), the Court could have responded to 
the constitutional disruption through a more tailored reading of the Voting 
Rights Act—and, as such, allowed some of the applications of sections 4(b) 
and 5 to remain in effect over offending jurisdictions.204 
 
 200.  Id. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It is true that, had the Court taken Justice 
Ginsburg’s approach, the timing of the severability analysis would have depended on whether the 
statute’s constitutional applications included its application to Shelby County. If it did not, then 
the Court would have severed that application while indicating that some separate set of 
applications could remain in force. If it did constitutionally apply to Shelby County, however, 
then Shelby County would have simply lost its case—but some future litigant (perhaps Arizona 
or Alaska, per Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion) might have been able to bring a successful 
challenge, thereby requiring severability to occur at that point in time. 
 201.  Id. at 2629 (plurality opinion) (“We cannot pretend that we are reviewing an updated 
statute, or try our hand at updating the statute ourselves, based on the new record compiled by 
Congress.”). 
 202.  Implementing Justice Ginsburg’s proposed approach would require, at a minimum, a 
very complicated form of application severability. In addition, if one were to take Justice 
Ginsburg’s proposal a step further and wade into the reformulation of section 4 (rather than 
simply its partial invalidation), that more radical approach likely would require some 
combination of expanding applications (to include offending jurisdictions not covered by section 
4 prior to its invalidation), employing nonstandard meanings of the statute (at least, insofar as 
the constitutional disruption of section 4 might be treated as an invitation to create a new formula 
in its absence), or relying on implicit substitute provisions. See supra Part III.A (describing 
resistance to all these forms of analysis in the context of severability). 
 203.  The 2006 reauthorization of sections 4 and 5 included, among other things, the 
severability clause discussed by Justice Ginsburg and 15,000 pages of legislative record setting 
forth “countless ‘examples of flagrant racial discrimination’ since the last reauthorization” of the 
Voting Rights Act as well as “systematic evidence that ‘intentional racial discrimination in voting 
remains so serious and widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still 
needed.’” Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 
679 F.3d 848, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Both these inclusions are evidence of legislative intent to 
retain some portion of section 4(b) in response to the constitutional disruption identified by the 
Shelby County majority. 
 204.  It is worth noting that the Shelby County majority might have denied the propriety of 
such an outcome not only as a matter of severability, but also as a matter of substantive 
constitutional law. Cf. id. at 2629–30 (implying, cryptically, that the Constitution could allow no 
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A second illustration of severability’s effects comes in response to the so-
called legislative veto, which appears in hundreds of federal statutes and 
which the Supreme Court declared to be unconstitutional in Immigration & 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha.205 This substantive constitutional ruling has 
required the courts to wade through numerous statutes to determine whether 
the legislative veto in each is severable (and therefore, under the dominant 
view of severability, invalid on its own) or inseverable (and therefore invalid 
along with the rest of the statute).206 What the dominant framework does not 
allow is some third option. To take but one example, Congress might have 
intended for the legislative veto to be treated as severable with respect to 
certain grants of authority to the executive branch but inseverable with 
respect to other such grants—even where the statute’s text would not allow 
for such a result through straightforward excision.207 As Glenn Smith has 
argued, this third approach may most closely track congressional intent.208 Yet 
due to its tension with severability’s restrictions, the courts do not even 
consider it.209 
A third illustration of the effects of severability’s narrowing framework 
already has appeared in this Article. In Booker, the Court concluded that the 
Sentencing Reform Act violated the Constitution.210 The Court then 
concluded, in response to this constitutional disruption, that Congress would 
have intended the following judicial responses, in descending order of 
preference: 
First, for the Court to “make the Guidelines system advisory” 
through the invalidation of two provisions that, on their own, 
did not impose any unconstitutionality.211 
 
application of section 4(b) to remain in effect because the way section 4(b) selected 
jurisdictions—through reliance on a previously constitutional formula that itself had been based 
on now decades-old data—was as incurably unconstitutional as imposing invidious restrictions on 
a suspect class). If that is the correct reading of Shelby County’s holding, then the majority should 
have been pressed to articulate this novel theory of constitutional law. As it stands, severability’s 
restrictive framework allows the entire debate to be, in effect, swept under the rug. 
 205.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983); see also id. at 
959–60 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds of statutes, 
dating back to the 1930s.”). 
 206.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 59, at 398–99; see also id. at 398 n.3 and accompanying text 
(cataloging some of these cases). 
 207.  Id. at 465–66. 
 208.  Id. at 464–66 (discussing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987)). 
 209.  Id. at 465 (“The courts deciding the Alaska Airlines severability dispute conceived their 
task as deciding whether the legislative veto provision Congress had included was severable from 
all of the employee protection rulemaking grant, or none of it.”). 
 210.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
 211.  Id. at 246. 
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Second, for the Court to invalidate the entire Sentencing 
Reform Act.212 
Third, for the Court, while continuing to enforce much of the 
Sentencing Reform Act, to invalidate a subset of its applications 
(that is, those imposing sentences that had been increased based 
on facts not found by a jury).213 
As discussed above, any of these approaches would have cured the 
constitutional defect—but only the second and the third were permissible 
under the dominant severability framework.214 In perhaps the Supreme 
Court’s only overt rejection of the dominant severability framework, the 
majority adopted the first approach. In so doing, it avoided what severability 
otherwise would have required: total invalidation of the Act.215 
These three examples help to illustrate the profound effects of 
severability’s restrictive framework. Without it, one of the most important civil 
rights provisions might still be in partial effect; hundreds of statutes might still 
include a more tailored grant of authority to the executive; and Booker’s 
“audacious” approach to constitutionally disrupted statutes might be the 
standard rather than the exception.216 And, of course, this list is far from 
exhaustive. An abundance of examples help to illustrate how the statutory 
landscape might change in the absence of severability’s restrictive effects. The 
National Federation majority, for example, might have further minimized the 
disruption caused to the ACA by the flaw in its Medicaid expansion.217 Courts’ 
 
 212.  Id. at 249. 
 213.  Id. at 246. See generally supra notes 122–32 and accompanying text (discussing Booker). 
 214.  See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 215.  This conclusion assumes that the majority’s conclusions about legislative intent were 
correct. Compare Booker, 543 U.S. at 249 (plurality opinion) (summarizing majority’s conclusions 
about legislative intent), with Booker, 543 U.S. at 295–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) 
(explaining the contrary conclusion that “given the choice between the statute created by the 
Court today or a clean slate on which to write a wholly different law, Congress undoubtedly would 
have selected the latter”). This Article does not take a position on which of these competing 
conclusions about legislative intent was correct. Instead, it explores the effects of failing to follow 
legislative intent in fidelity to the severability doctrine. 
 216.  Walsh, supra note 7, at 750 (referring to “the Court’s audacious use of [severability] in 
United States v. Booker”). Among the many others who have criticized Booker’s approach to 
severability is David Gans. See Gans, supra note 24, at 666 (arguing that “Booker illustrates the 
dangers that occur when a court uses severability doctrine to make fundamental changes to a 
legislature’s work and the need for better doctrinal tools in this area”). But see Gillian E. Metzger, 
Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 893 (2005) (“[A]ccepting arguendo the 
majority’s reading of the Sentencing Act, its remedial approach of facial invalidation was perfectly 
legitimate.”). 
 217.  As the dissent observed, “[t]he Court today opts for permitting the cut-off of only 
incremental Medicaid funding, but it might just as well have permitted, say, the cut-off of funds 
that represent no more than x percent of the State’s budget.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2667 (2012) (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting). Absent the restrictive framework of severability, the dissent’s observation is correct: 
the Court very well might have considered the “x percent” approach, which it could have adopted 
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attempts to construe the Bankruptcy Code in light of the Court’s opinion in 
Stern v. Marshall might more naturally track legislative intent—rather than 
threaten the practical collapse of the entire code based on an “isolated” 
constitutional disruption that, according to the Stern majority, did not 
“change all that much.”218 And, of course, innumerable lower-court opinions 
might have come out differently.219 Indeed, elimination of severability’s 
restrictive effects raises the possibility that any given successful constitutional 
challenge to a statute might have resulted in a different treatment of that same 
statute.220 
Yet even this summary understates the potential effects of severability’s 
narrowing framework, for it has not yet acknowledged where the doctrine 
appears to be headed. As dissents like those in National Federation have made 
clear, an even more restrictive form of severability—with its resistance to 
editorial freedom and its rejection of application severability—would result in 
the full invalidation of statutes with far more frequency.221 At least one scholar 
 
if it more closely aligned with legislative intent. 
 218.  Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502 (2011). The practical collapse of the Bankruptcy 
Code was threatened, for example, in Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014). 
Arkison was a follow up to Stern. In Stern, the Court had concluded, first, that the Code granted 
bankruptcy courts the authority to issue final judgments with respect to certain matters and, 
second, that this same grant of authority was unconstitutional. The question in Arkison therefore 
became what authority, if any, the bankruptcy courts retained over those same matters. Though 
congressional intent seemed clearly to point in one direction (that is, to allow bankruptcy courts 
to resolve these matters by issuing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law), several 
members of the Court refused to accept that severability would permit such a result. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 48, Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (No. 12-1200) (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: 
That’s what I thought severability was. If you carve—if you find part of it unconstitutional, you 
ask whether what is left can stand. You don’t say that we’re going to rewrite what is left.”); id. at 
15 (“JUSTICE SCALIA: Congress might have—might have provided that if it had known about 
[Stern], right? . . . But do we sit here to write the statutes that Congress would have written . . . if 
they knew about some future events? I don’t think so.”). The Court ended up resolving the issue 
by concluding that the text of the Code allowed the matters in question to be classified differently 
and, as a result, avoided any need to “rewrite what is left.” Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2173 (noting that 
“[t]he conclusion that the remainder of the statute may continue to apply to Stern claims accords 
with our general approach to severability”). It is not clear what the Court would have done if the 
text of the statute did not happen to permit such a conclusion—nor what it will do in the future 
when post-Stern problems cannot be so easily avoided. 
 219.  See, e.g., Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 905 F. Supp. 
2d 317, 350 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting alternative construction of the constitutionally disrupted 
statute because “[i]n doing so, the Court would go beyond merely construing the statute, and 
would engage in lawmaking”). 
 220.  The uncertainty is there because courts rarely even consider whether Congress might 
have preferred some option other than the two traditionally permitted under the severability 
framework. With the elimination of severability’s limiting effects, the analysis with respect to any 
given statute might reveal a strong legislative preference for some third option. 
 221.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (advocating for the full invalidation of statutes rather than 
what it referred to as the “more extreme exercise of the judicial power” that can be implied by 
partial invalidation). 
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has taken this approach to its logical conclusion, arguing that any 
constitutional flaw (regardless how small, and regardless of legislative intent) 
requires the complete invalidation of the implicated statute.222 Tellingly, this 
scholar’s argument has been cited multiple times in briefs filed with the 
United States Supreme Court.223 
In short, while the narrowing framework of severability may suffer from 
a lack of theorization (and acknowledgement), it does not suffer from a lack 
of practical consequence. To the contrary, these limitations pack a powerful 
punch. 
III. SEVERABILITY AS AN UNJUSTIFIED DOCTRINE 
The dominant framework for severability restricts the courts’ options at 
the expense of legislative intent. This dynamic has serious practical 
consequences on the continued operation of constitutionally disrupted 
statutes. As this Part reveals, these effects need justification to retain 
legitimacy. Yet no such justification exists. 
This Part begins by explaining that while any interference with legislative 
intent is troubling, the disruptive effects of severability are particularly 
problematic in light of the ways in which they are inconsistent with 
fundamental principles purporting to underlie the severability doctrine. This 
Part then attempts to identify such a justification—but it cannot. Even the 
most plausible justifications for severability’s constraints fail on their own 
terms. 
In the absence of justification, the severability framework should be 
replaced. This Part therefore concludes with an outline for an improved 
regime. This new regime allows courts to effectuate legislative intent without 
grappling with severability’s unjustified restrictions. 
A.   THE LACK OF JUSTIFICATION FOR SEVERABILITY’S DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS 
Severability’s restrictive framework requires justification for two 
overarching reasons: first, because its effects are inconsistent with 
fundamental principles purporting to support the severability doctrine; and, 
second, because courts routinely engage in those same practices, largely 
without controversy, in other legal contexts. Taken either independently or 
together, these two concerns should be considered to shift the burden. Either 
some justification affirmatively supports these discrepancies, or one should 
seek to eliminate their cause. 
Severability’s limiting effects are inconsistent with at least three 
fundamental principles driving the severability doctrine. At the outset, 
 
 222.  Campbell, supra note 11, at 1496–98. 
 223.  See, e.g., Brief of the Family Research Council and 27 Members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and Reversal on the Issue of Severability 
at 26–27, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400). 
A3_MANHEIM (DO NOT DELETE) 7/4/2016  4:26 PM 
2016] BEYOND SEVERABILITY 1873 
severability doctrine purports, at its core, to effectuate legislative intent.224 As 
a result, there is a deep and troubling conflict that arises when the severability 
framework actually prevents a court from following legislative intent. 
A second frequently articulated goal of severability is to treat 
constitutionally disrupted statutes in a way that “limit[s] the solution to the 
problem.”225 Stated otherwise, severability is intended to help “minimiz[e] the 
damage done to the statute by judicial fiat.”226 Yet when the severability 
framework interferes with a court’s efforts to effectuate legislative intent, it is 
not “minimizing” the damage done to the statute. Quite to the contrary, it is 
limiting the solutions potentially available to the court in its efforts to achieve 
this end. As a result, it is actually increasing the damage done to the statute. 
Such an approach not only nullifies the legislature’s work as it relates to the 
constitutional defect; it also nullifies the legislature’s work as it relates to how 
the legislature intended for a court to respond to the constitutional 
disruption.227 
Finally, severability is supposed to promote judicial restraint by 
preventing a court from engaging in so-called judicial legislation. Yet at best, 
this goal is in serious tension with severability’s restrictive framework. This is 
because adherence to legislative intent—which, to be sure, is defined 
differently depending which jurist or commentator one asks228—normally is 
what ensures a court is effectuating Congress’s statutes rather than creating 
its own law.229 By rejecting legislative intent in favor of its own conception of 
 
 224.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 & 11-400) (“[Though each of the Supreme Court’s cases on 
severability] formulate[s] the test a little bit differently, . . . every one of them talks about 
congressional intent.”); see also supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 225.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006); see also supra 
note 73 and accompanying text. 
 226.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 282 (2005). (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 227.  The phrase “legislature’s work” is taken from Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (stating that 
severability analysis helps “not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is necessary”). 
 228.  Compare SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 152, at 30 (“Traditional authorities on 
interpretation, while repeating the mantra that the objective of interpretation is to discern the 
lawgiver’s or the private drafter’s intent, would add that this intent is to be derived solely from 
the words of the text. We would have no substantive quarrel with the search for ‘intent’ if that 
were all that was meant.” (footnote omitted)), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History 
in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 864 (1992) (“Conceptually, . . . one can ascribe an 
‘intent’ to Congress in enacting the words of a statute if one means ‘intent’ in its, here relevant, 
sense of ‘purpose,’ rather than its sense of ‘motive.’”); see also Lawrence M. Solan, Private 
Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 
427, 458 (2005) (arguing that “[t]ext-based canons of construction” are not “an alternative to 
considering legislative intent” but rather “default rules for assessing the likely intent”). 
 229.  This is particularly true in the context of severability, where even those wary of calls to 
legislative intent (such as the late Justice Scalia) agree that legislative intent must be what controls 
the analysis. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2668 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). But cf. Gans, supra note 24, at 688 (arguing that severability 
should be considered a question of remedy). See also supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
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how best to construe and apply a constitutionally disrupted statute, a court 
opens itself to criticism that it is doing precisely what it purporting to avoid: 
that is, substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature. 
In addition to requiring justification due to inconsistencies with respect 
to its own fundamental principles, severability requires justification because it 
relies on an incongruous characterization of which practices lie within the 
judicial sphere. As explained above, severability limits courts’ options by 
discouraging or prohibiting certain practices on the grounds that they do not 
lie within the judicial function.230 Yet courts routinely engage in those same 
practices, typically without controversy, in other legal contexts. Specific 
illustrations of this phenomenon are illustrated in the discussion above.231 It 
is true that some of these approaches may inspire criticism from certain jurists 
and commentators even when employed outside the context of severability. 
For example, certain justices are more likely than others to be willing to 
expand a statute’s applications when fashioning a “remedy.”232 The 
underlying discrepancy nevertheless remains. At a minimum, this incongruity 
undermines the idea that the practices in question obviously, inherently, or 
necessarily constitute “judicial legislation” or otherwise lie outside of what a 
court is permitted to do. Yet that is precisely the explanation provided for why, 
in the context of severability, these same practices are considered off-limits. 
Combined, these two overarching observations—relating to 
inconsistencies with severability’s fundamental principles and with other areas 
of the law—force a defender of the severability framework to find some 
offsetting justification in support of its limiting effects. Otherwise, the 
framework should be replaced. As the remainder of this Part explains, no such 
justification appears to exist. 
Certainly, no justification appears in the case law itself. Perhaps this is 
because no reasoned justification ever motivated this aspect of the doctrine. 
Stated otherwise, it may be that the limiting effects of severability emerged, in 
effect, accidentally, as courts and commentators have either overlooked how 
the doctrine narrows court’s options or passively accepted the correctness of 
the underlying assumption (that is, that Congress would have wanted a court 
to disregard the statute in whole or in part). 
Even in the absence of expressly stated justifications, it is appropriate to 
try to identify justifications that could support severability’s limiting effects. 
For in the absence of critical analysis there are, for many, deeply held 
intuitions about severability: that it simply makes sense for a court to try to limit 
the solution to the problem in response to a constitutionally disrupted statute; 
that it makes sense for a court to refrain from rewriting a statute or otherwise 
from adopting the legislative role; in short, that it makes sense for a court to 
 
 230.  See supra Part III.A. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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apply the severability framework in a form similar to how it now stands. 
Despite the appeal of these intuitions, however, normative support for 
severability’s limiting effects begins to collapse once the possible justifications 
are subject to critical analysis. 
In an effort to illustrate the deficiencies of possible justifications, this 
Article attempts to identify and analyze the most persuasive. All five of these 
possible justifications rely on theories of judicial restraint. More specifically, 
all rely on a conception of judicial restraint that seems most reasonably to 
justify limiting a court’s options in the face of contrary legislative intent: 
namely, that courts should not engage in legislative work. 
The first three of these possible justifications already have appeared in 
this Article, as they are captured by the three possible tests for drawing the 
line, in the context of severability, between the legislative and the judicial 
spheres. This Article has termed these tests the Blue Pencil Test,233 the 
Complexity Test,234 and the Primary Drafter Test.235 Underlying each of these 
tests is the same general principle: a court must stay in its proper lane and not 
veer into legislative territory.236 It is this principle of judicial restraint that 
purports to provide a justification for the three tests’ restrictive effects. As 
such, the strength of each test as a possible justification for severability 
depends, at a minimum, on how convincingly each polices the line between 
the judicial and the legislative spheres. 
The fourth possible justification goes to a more general concern: 
institutional competence. More specifically, this fourth possible justification 
derives from the idea that courts lack the ability to engage with 
constitutionally disrupted statutes without the restrictions imposed by the 
severability framework. The fifth and final possible justification is even more 
general. Essentially, it proposes that, regardless of the specific test used, a 
court simply cannot engage in judicial rewriting of a constitutionally 
disrupted statute. As such, the court’s options must be so limited. As this Part 
of this Article demonstrates, none of these five possible justifications 
adequately supports the ways severability limits the courts’ options. Each 
possible justification is addressed in turn. 
The Blue Pencil Justification. The first justification is reflected in the Blue 
Pencil Test. This test requires that a court respond to a constitutionally 
disrupted statute by (metaphorically) striking out statutory provisions or 
other bits of statutory language. Any other response is impermissible. The line 
drawn by the Blue Pencil Test, as such, deems “text severability” permissible 
but refuses to accept the validity of “application severability.”237 
 
 233.  See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 234.  See supra notes 89–101 and accompanying text. 
 235.  See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
 236.  See generally supra Part II.B. 
 237.  See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text for definitions of text severability and 
application severability. 
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Despite the intuitive appeal of this test, it suffers from a host of 
deficiencies in purporting to police the judicial/legislative line. At the outset, 
it quickly leads to what many would consider arbitrary results. To illustrate, it 
would treat the following two statutes differently: 
Statute 1: Any person convicted of murder committed at any time 
shall be incarcerated for thirty years.238 
Statute 2: Any person convicted of murder committed before, on, or 
after the date of this statute’s enactment shall be incarcerated for 
thirty years.239 
Assume, as suggested above, that both statutes violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause as applied to someone who already has been convicted.240 Assume 
further that legislative intent indicates that Congress would have preferred, in 
the case of a constitutional defect, for as many applications as possible to 
remain in force.241 If the Blue Pencil Test properly policed the line between 
permissible and impermissible judicial responses, then the court would be 
forced to invalidate the entirety of Statute 1, for there is no other way to “blue 
pencil” the statute to remove the offending applications. By contrast, the 
court would be able to “blue pencil” Statute 2 in a way that permitted a 
significant fraction of its applications (i.e., all those relating to murders 
occurring on or after the date of the statute’s enactment) to continue in force. 
Despite the fact that the two statutes, in substance, are identical, the Blue 
Pencil Test requires radically different treatment in response to the 
constitutional disruption. 
A related problem with the Blue Pencil Test is that it fails to account for 
application severability. As discussed above, application severability is a 
historically well-established use of the severability doctrines.242 However, it is 
one that cannot be accomplished merely by running a blue pencil through 
the relevant statutory language. The recent hostility to application severability 
should not be mistaken for a reflection of the doctrine as it has been long 
understood. To the contrary, any refusal to employ application severability 
marks a quite drastic turn in the case law.243 
And the fundamental problems with the Blue Pencil Test run still deeper. 
This is because, as discussed above, a strict adherence to this position—that 
is, a refusal to accept the possibility of application severability, which is the 
 
 238. As noted above, this example originally was adopted from Adrian Vermeule, Saving 
Constructions, supra note 58, at 1955. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  See id. (explaining challenge). 
 241.  Evidence of such intent might, for example, include a severability clause. See Gans, supra 
note 24, at 646 n.28 (“Though not dispositive, courts regularly accord severability clauses 
significant weight.”). 
 242.  See supra notes 164–77 and accompanying text. 
 243.  See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
A3_MANHEIM (DO NOT DELETE) 7/4/2016  4:26 PM 
2016] BEYOND SEVERABILITY 1877 
essence of the Blue Pencil Test—would have deeply disruptive ripple effects 
across all statutes subject to constitutional challenge.244 It is not clear that such 
a system would even be workable.245 At best, the system would be internally 
inconsistent, as an insistence on judicial restraint purports to justify both  
(1) the Blue Pencil Test’s refusal to allow application severability and (2) the 
courts’ stated preference for as-applied challenges over facial challenges. 
Application severability and as-applied challenges are, in many cases, two sides 
of the very same coin.246 
In short, the conception of the judicial function characterized by the 
Blue Pencil Test fails to provide adequate support for severability’s limiting 
functions. It leads to inconsistent, arbitrary results; it fails to track the 
longstanding case law; and its adoption would require severe and unjustified 
changes to the way courts respond to any statute potentially subject to a 
constitutional challenge. It is, of course, possible that the Blue Pencil Test 
reflects a deeper concern: that courts simply should not be rewriting statutes, 
no matter the cost. Yet that concern, which is discussed in detail below,247 also 
is not able to justify severability’s restrictive framework. 
The Complexity Justification. The second possible justification is captured 
by the Complexity Test. The Complexity Test purports to draw a line between, 
on the one hand, judicial treatment of statutes that is relatively 
straightforward (and therefore, under this approach, permissible) and, on the 
other hand, judicial treatment of statutes that is too complicated or creative 
to constitute “judicial work” and is therefore properly understood to 
constitute work that is legislative in nature. References to this idea appear with 
great frequency in the doctrine.248 Yet this test also fails on closer analysis. 
At the outset, this approach does not—and, importantly, cannot—track 
existing doctrine. It is inherently incapable of doing so. This is because the 
standard it purports to advance is so vague and subjective that it provides 
essentially no guidance to courts or observers. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. National Treasury 
Employees Union249 provides one illustration of how the Complexity Test fails 
to provide such guidance. In National Treasury Employees Union, the plaintiffs 
had challenged certain provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, which 
prohibited federal employees from accepting honoraria for engaging in 
specified types of expressive activity. The Court found the Act, as written, 
violated the First Amendment. This led to the question: how should the state 
be applied going forward?250 
 
 244.  See supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text. 
 245.  See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 246.  See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See infra notes 272–74 and accompanying text. 
 248.  See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. 
 249.  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 250.  See id. at 477. 
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The Court made clear that, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, 
at least four readings would have responded adequately to the constitutional 
defect it had identified.251 While these four readings all would have cured the 
constitutional defect, each would have done so in a different way. The first 
was (arguably) the least complicated, and the fourth the most.252 If severability 
doctrine meaningfully tracked the complexity of the relevant analysis, the 
question concerning the court’s options in National Treasury Employees Union 
would be straightforward: at what point does this proposed treatment of the 
statute become too complicated? Yet severability does not (and could not) 
reliably track this line—a fact confirmed by the judicial chaos that ensued in 
response to this statute. 
The Court of Appeals, planting the first stake, rejected the fourth reading 
as a “purely legislative act” before concluding that principles of severability 
required it to adopt the second reading.253 Judge Sentelle disagreed. In 
dissent, the judge insisted that the first reading was proper and that any other 
reading was “‘nothing less than judicial legislation.’”254 After the case went to 
the Supreme Court, the majority insisted on a still different reading—the 
third reading—citing “our obligation to avoid judicial legislation” as its reason 
for rejecting the fourth reading and overruling the Court of Appeals as to the 
second.255 Meanwhile, Justice O’Connor drafted a separate opinion accusing 
the majority of misunderstanding the severability doctrines and arguing in 
favor of the fourth reading, which at least eight other jurists already had 
rejected as invading the legislative sphere.256 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for his 
part, similarly endorsed the fourth reading, but refused to join Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion.257 Instead, he wrote his own, in which he accused the 
majority of (what else?) “rewrit[ing] the statute.”258 
 
 251.  The four constructions were as follows. First, the Court could have disregarded all the 
relevant provisions of the Act in all their applications. Second, the Court could have disregarded 
the relevant provisions of the Act insofar as they applied to employees in the Executive Branch. 
Third, the Court could have disregarded the relevant provisions of the Act insofar as they applied 
to employees in the Executive Branch who were of a sufficiently low rank. Fourth, the Court could 
have disregarded the relevant provisions of the Act insofar as they applied to employees in the 
Executive Branch who were of a sufficiently low rank and whose expressive conduct lacked a 
sufficient “nexus” to the relevant employment. See id. at 477–80. 
 252.  See the preceding footnote for the four constructions listed in order of apparent 
complexity. Of course, one could argue for a different complexity hierarchy if one phrased the 
options in a different way—a point that itself helps to confirm the fundamental failings of the 
Complexity Test. 
 253.  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 254.  Id. at 1296 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoting Ballard v. Miss. Cotton Oil Co., 34 So. 
533, 554 (Miss. 1903)). 
 255.  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995). 
 256.  Id. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 257.  Id. at 489 (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
 258.  Id. at 502 n.8. 
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The divided and unconvincing manner in which National Treasury 
Employees Union came to a conclusion—one dominated by contradictory 
accusations of legislating from the bench—helps to demonstrate how 
severability analysis is fundamentally incommensurate with a distinction based 
on complexity of analysis. The majority’s analysis was nothing if not 
complicated, just like that of all the other myriad, conflicting opinions issued 
in this case. This failure to implement the “complexity” line is a result, at least 
in part, of the complexity line being too subjective and vague to be 
meaningful. As the finger-pointing in National Treasury Employees Union 
confirmed, one cannot draw a clear and consistent line between readings of 
a statute that are “imaginative”259 or “creative”260 or “novel”261 rather than 
“easily . . . articulat[ed]”262 or “relatively simple,”263 particularly when each 
case and challenged statute has its own details and complexities. (And, as 
Professor Dorf has explained, even seemingly simple statutes have their own 
inherent complexities.264) 
Even if the Complexity Test did somehow provide meaningful guidance, 
its enforcement would lead to radical effects in the ways courts construe and 
apply statutes. As discussed above,265 a court’s refusal to engage in 
complicated analysis would implicate not only severability analysis, but also its 
ability to construe or apply any statute that happened to present 
complications. Yet under no conception of the judicial role are the courts 
limited to the application and enforcement of simple statutes. 
A blanket resistance to complexity in statutory analysis also would call 
into question the ability of courts to engage in federal common law making. 
Under even the most restrictive understandings of the federal courts’ 
lawmaking powers, however, courts are able to develop rules of decision 
under certain conditions.266 In Justice Scalia’s words, courts may engage in 
“federal common law (in the sense of judicially pronounced law)” in areas 
where “‘Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive 
 
 259.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986). 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 284 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 262.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  See Dorf, supra note 56, at 370 (“[L]et us ask what it means to say, in some particular 
case, that a plaintiff challenges the application to him of some ‘law.’ Consider federal statutes. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution uses the word ‘Law’ to refer to bills that have been 
successfully enacted, a category that, in modern times, includes omnibus legislation concerning 
disparate subjects codified in different sections of the U.S. Code. In addition, courts frequently 
and sensibly use the term ‘law’ to refer to an uninterrupted string of text appearing somewhere 
in the U.S. Code, even if that text emerged from successive enactments of Congress, each one 
amending what came before.” (footnote omitted)). 
 265.  See supra notes 151–53. 
 266.  See Nelson, supra note 154, at 8 (acknowledging that even “skeptics of federal common 
law” carve out exceptions when Congress has conferred on the courts “a special delegation of 
lawmaking authority”). 
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law’”267 and also, at times, when an area of the law involves “uniquely federal 
interests.”268 While scholars and jurists may disagree with respect to what is 
necessary to trigger such conditions, the fundamental point remains. Unless 
one is willing to challenge settled law on the propriety of “judicially 
pronounced law,” one cannot justify severability’s limiting effects as a means 
to avoid creativity or complexity in statutory construction (both hallmarks of 
federal common law making). Something more is needed. 
To this end, it is possible that the Complexity Test means to accomplish 
something slightly different. Perhaps it is meant to prevent courts from 
engaging in creative, complicated, or otherwise freewheeling forms of 
analyses due to concerns that such analysis, by definition, cannot conform 
with congressional intent. While that concern may be motivating the 
Complexity Test, it is more precisely captured in the Primary Drafter Test. 
The Primary Drafter Justification. The Primary Drafter Test, which reflects 
the third possible justification for severability’s restrictive framework, permits 
a court to sever a statute, or “impose a limiting construction” on one, only if 
the result would “sufficiently reflect the structure and history of the statute to 
be attributed to Congress, rather than the court.”269 The problem with the test 
is not in its articulation. The Primary Draft Test, as articulated, is entirely 
consistent with legislative intent, and, as such, it does not pose many of the 
problems identified above. Rather, the problem with the Primary Draft Test 
is that it fails to explain why a court would ever deviate from legislative intent 
when construing or applying a constitutionally disrupted statute. 
Stated otherwise, it is not clear how this justification supports the 
restrictions imposed by severability’s framework. If a court construing a 
statute merely is following Congress’s intent, then it is difficult to understand 
how the result could do anything other than “reflect the structure and history 
of the statute to be attributed to Congress.” If this is correct—in other words, 
if it is correct to conclude that Congress is the primary drafter of the statute 
so long as the court is effectuating legislative intent—then the Primary Drafter 
Test collapses into a legislative-intent test, and the former test has no 
independent meaning. Courts grappling with a constitutionally disrupted 
statute simply must effectuate legislative intent. 
It nevertheless is possible that, as with the other tests, the Primary Draft 
test means to respond to a deeper concern: here, a concern over the propriety 
of a court engaging in a truly untethered, open-ended sort of decision-
making. The concern tracks anxieties about overly aggressive or otherwise 
 
 267.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 
640 (1981)); see also supra note 154. 
 268.  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. 451 
U.S. at 640). 
 269.  Fallon, supra note 24, at 1333–45 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997)). 
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illegitimate forms of federal common-law making,270 and it arises in particular 
when a court is formulating rules of decision that lack a clear source of 
legislative authority.271 Under this theory, a court formulating these sorts of 
rules has crossed the “vague line that divides judicial interpretation from 
judicial legislation.”272 
Although this concern over freewheeling decision-making does appear 
to reflect an anxiety motivating the Primary Drafter Test, it again fails to 
explain how a court’s treatment of a constitutionally disrupted statute should 
ever deviate from the effectuation of legislative intent. As discussed above, few 
would argue that federal courts lack lawmaking powers when Congress has so 
empowered them,273 which is precisely the scenario envisioned in this context. 
The collapse of this third test into a legislative-intent test precludes it 
from justifying the ways that severability precludes courts from following 
legislative intent. It nevertheless helps to bring to the fore an additional 
concern, which relates to institutional competence. 
The Institutional Competence Justification. Accommodation of institutional 
competence motivates the fourth possible justification. Pursuant to this 
theory, courts lack the competence to follow legislative intent with respect to 
certain constitutionally disrupted statutes. As a result, their options must be 
narrowed. To illustrate, the Court in Ayotte appears to be alluding to this 
concern when noting, in response to a constitutionally disrupted statute, that 
courts should be “mindful that [their] constitutional mandate and 
institutional competence are limited.”274 
This concern is certainly a fair one. There is little question that 
discerning legislative intent—always a tricky endeavor—is particularly difficult 
in the context of a constitutionally disrupted statute.275 Yet this justification 
also fails to carry the weight it must. In part, this is for the same reasons that 
the prior justifications involving the Complexity and the Primary Drafter tests 
fall short: namely, legislative intent often is considered to be what defines a 
court’s competence. And a court normally will not refuse even to try to 
effectuate such intent on the grounds that the task is difficult. This has not 
been the courts’ standard response, for example, when faced with statutes 
 
 270.  See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 154. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Fallon, supra note 24, at 1333. 
 273.  See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text. 
 274.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006). 
 275.  See Walsh, supra note 7, at 752–53 (“Severability doctrine requires focus on hypothetical 
intent because there often is no actual, expressed legislative intent to be found. The hypothetical 
legislative intent test gets around this absence of any actual legislative intent to discern but does 
so by posing a question whose answer often calls for rank speculation. The inquiry ‘can perhaps 
be given some content by reference to legislative purpose, or to the ‘enterprise’ to which the 
statute belongs. But it can easily deteriorate into a question of what ought to happen, in which 
case ‘legislative intent’ adds nothing.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Sherwin, supra note 43, at 
304–05)). 
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requiring the courts to delve deeply into difficult questions of a legislature’s 
policies, purposes, or priorities.276 
In addition, if the concern is that the courts will get the answer wrong, 
that concern exists even if the courts’ options are narrowed. (Indeed, if 
anything, it applies with greater force if court’s options are narrowed, given 
the possibility that Congress would have intended one of the prohibited 
responses.) Some jurists and commentators nevertheless treat less 
controversial forms of severability as not posing these same concerns. The 
dissent did so in National Federation, for example, when it criticized the 
majority’s “revis[ion]” of the statute as one that 
creates a debilitated, inoperable version of health-care regulation 
that Congress did not enact and the public does not expect. It makes 
enactment of sensible health-care regulation more difficult, since 
Congress cannot start afresh but must take as its point of departure a 
jumble of now senseless provisions, provisions that certain interests 
favored under the Court’s new design will struggle to retain. And it 
leaves the public and the States to expend vast sums of money on 
requirements that may or may not survive the necessary 
congressional revision.277 
This all may be true. Yet the dissent’s proposed solution—declaring the 
ACA inseverable and invaliding it in full278—also would have “created a 
debilitated, inoperable version of health-care regulation that Congress did 
not enact and the public does not expect.”279 It also would have replaced 
Congress’s enacted statutory regime with a different statutory regime (i.e., the 
 
 276.  See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885, 899 
(2007) (discussing Section 1 of the Sherman Act and noting that “the Court has never ‘taken a 
literal approach to [its] language,’” but rather “has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law 
statute” that “evolve[s] to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions” (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006))); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 
30, 60 (1986) (endorsing the district court’s intricate analytical framework in response to general 
language set forth in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended); Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect 
Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015) (exploring the role of the courts vis-à-vis complicated modern statutes); 
see also Gluck, supra at 64 (describing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), as the Supreme 
Court’s “most explicit recognition ever of modern statutory complexity”). 
 277.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012) (joint opinion of 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 278.  It is worth noting that the dissent’s proposed solution (full invalidation) was associated 
with its conclusion not only that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional, but also that the 
individual mandate was unconstitutional. Were the dissent to agree with the plurality that only 
the first was unconstitutional, it is not clear what its proposed solution would be, though it seems 
likely it would be to disregard all portions of the ACA that addressed the Medicaid Expansion. Id. 
at 2667. (“The most natural remedy would be to invalidate the Medicaid Expansion.”). If true, 
this only makes the underlying point stronger: this Medicaid-free revision of the ACA would suffer 
from all of the same “version” flaws flagged by the dissent. 
 279.  Id. at 2676. 
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comprehensive legal regime against which the ACA was enacted), one that 
“certain interests favored under the Court’s new design [would] struggle to 
retain” and with respect to which others would “expend vast sums of money” 
to achieve compliance, notwithstanding the possibility of congressional 
revision.280 And despite the dissent’s attempt at differentiating between the 
situations facing Congress in the case of partial invalidation versus total 
invalidation,281 the tool Congress has at its disposal to remedy judicial errors 
in statutory construction remains the same: it can enact statutes that fix the 
court’s errors. 
As a final point, it may be that, for those concerned about institutional 
competence, it is simply inconceivable to accept the propriety of a court 
engaging in truly freewheeling, untethered reconceptualizing of a 
constitutionally defective statute. Imagine, for example, that a majority of 
Supreme Court justices had agreed with the dissent that the Constitution 
could not support the ACA’s individual mandate. One response to cure that 
constitutional defect would be, as discussed above,282 to completely rewrite 
the statute (which is founded on the participation of private insurance 
companies) to transform it into a single-payer scheme run entirely by the 
federal government. Those concerned about institutional competence might 
insist that it can never be correct to expect a court to engage in such a 
complicated reconceptualization of an already extraordinarily intricate 
statute. 
That response is almost certainly right—but not because the court 
necessarily lacks competence to concoct such a regime if Congress really had 
intended it. Rather, it is because it is not plausible to think that the ACA could 
be read to reflect such legislative intent. Stated otherwise, it is not plausible to 
think that this statute—the ACA—can support the conclusion that, in 
response to a constitutional disruption, Congress would have wanted the 
courts to engage in a wholesale reconceptualization of the entire health-care 
regime. Such an extreme example, then, is less likely to support severability’s 
restrictive framework than it is to illustrate that, with respect to any given 
statute, Congress would not have desired certain responses by the courts. 
The Intuitive Justification. In any event, these four identified 
justifications—each attempting to draw the line between what a court should 
and should not be doing—all fail to provide adequate support for 
severability’s restrictive framework. This leaves at least one final possible 
justification, one largely based on intuition. The idea is simple: courts cannot 
judicially rewrite a statute. As a result, their options when grappling with a 
 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  The above-quoted passage by the dissent suggests that Congress can “start afresh” only 
through total invalidation of the statute. Among other things, this ignores the comprehensive 
legal regime predating the enactment of the ACA. 
 282.  See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
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constitutionally disrupted statute must be limited to invalidating that statute 
in whole or in part. 
Despite the near ubiquity of this idea in the rhetoric of both courts and 
scholars,283 it is based on a false assumption: that limiting the courts’ options 
in the face of a constitutionally disrupted statute somehow affects whether 
they can be said to be “rewriting” that statute. Depending on how one defines 
this idea of “rewriting” a statute, it is either impossible for courts to engage in 
such behavior or impossible for them to avoid it. 
On the one hand, courts have no power actually to change statutory text. 
No matter what the court does, the text remains in the Code, exactly the same 
as before. In this sense, it is impossible for a court to rewrite a statute. 
On the other hand, the idea of “rewriting” a statute might refer to a 
court’s decision to construe or apply a statute in a nonstandard way—that is, 
in a way that deviates from the way it normally construes or applies a statute.284 
For a textualist, for example, this might be engaging in “atextual” analysis.285 
Pursuant to this understanding, a court is not literally enacting a revised 
statute when it engages in atextual analysis. But it is figuratively doing so. It is 
this understanding that frequently underlies the anxiety over “judicial 
legislation.” 
The problem with this understanding is that there is no way for a court, 
faced with a constitutionally disrupted statute, to avoid nonstandard statutory 
analysis. Even the most serious constitutional flaw does not cause a statute 
simply to disappear. To the contrary, all statutes—even constitutionally 
disrupted ones—require construction and application. By definition, of 
course, constitutionally disrupted statutes cannot be construed and applied 
in the way they normally would be; such analysis would lead to an 
unconstitutional result. So the court must engage in some other form of 
construction and application. 
Say, for example, a court engages in a very simple form of severability: it 
deems a provision of statute to be unconstitutional and then decides to 
disregard that provision when applying the statute in the future. This is a 
 
 283.  See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 11, at 1496; Gans, supra note 24, at 645; see also supra 
notes 249–58 and accompanying text (using United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 
U.S. 454 (1995), to illustrate, among other things, the extent to which opposing jurists accuse 
one another of impermissible judicial legislation). 
 284.  A more precise way of thinking about this distinction is to assume that there is some 
standard way of analyzing statutes. (Of course, jurists and scholars will disagree—vigorously—on 
whether such standards exist and, if so, how they should be understood.) The court might be said 
to be “rewriting” a statute, rather than “interpreting” or “construing” a statute, if it interprets or 
construes a statute in a manner that deviates from standard practice—that is, in a nonstandard 
way. For example, if a jurist believes that a statute should be interpreted based strictly on its text 
(standard analysis), then a court engages in “judicial rewriting” of that statute if it interprets it in 
a manner that does not derive strictly from its text (nonstandard analysis). 
 285.  John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 110 
(2006). 
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nonstandard (and atextual) treatment of the statute. Although the 
disregarded part of the statute remains right there in the Code, the court is 
treating it as though it does not exist. Alternatively, say the court decides to 
respond to the constitutional flaw by disregarding the statute in its entirety. 
The same result holds; this too is atextual. Even these two simple examples—
involving the most straightforward and least controversial applications of the 
severability framework—therefore involve a so-called “rewriting” of the 
relevant statute. 
Stated succinctly, if “rewriting” a statute is understood, as it commonly is, 
to refer to atextual or otherwise nonstandard statutory analysis, then there is 
no way for a court to avoid “rewriting” a constitutionally disrupted statute. As 
such, a desire to avoid judicial rewriting of statutes, without more, cannot 
support severability’s restrictive framework. 
None of the identified justifications, then, provides adequate cover for 
severability’s restrictive framework. And neither the case law nor the academic 
literature appears to have provided any additional justification. Given that 
severability’s framework nevertheless undermines legislative intent and the 
statutes that are implicated, this unjustified doctrine should be abolished.286 
B.  A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK 
In severability’s place, courts should turn to the principle purporting to 
animate this same doctrine: legislative intent. But instead of accepting 
severability’s artificial limitations on how to effectuate this intent, a court 
should conduct a broader inquiry. The court should determine, first, the 
various constructions of a constitutionally defective statute that would diffuse 
its constitutional defect and, second, which among these options the 
legislature would prefer. The court then should implement the legislatively 
preferred option. 
Adoption of this regime would produce results more closely aligned with 
those described above in Part II.B. As such, it would resist pernicious trends 
in the case law toward greater and more frequent invalidation of statutes. The 
Court’s controversial treatment of the Sentencing Reform Act in Booker would 
become the standard,287 rather than the anomaly, and blockbuster opinions 
such as Shelby County, Chadha, and Stern would be less likely to wreak havoc on 
the statutes they are scrutinizing.288 If this approach had been applied to 
preexisting cases, Part 4 of the Voting Rights Act very well might still be in 
partial force; executive power might be balanced in a manner that more 
closely tracks the intentions of the legislature that originally granted that 
 
 286.  Counterarguments, including those related to the incentives of Congress, abuse by the 
courts, difficulty of analysis, and stare decisis, are discussed below. See infra notes 301–13 and 
accompanying text. 
 287.  See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text. 
 288.  See supra notes 199–211, 220 and accompanying text. 
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power; and innumerable individuals attempting to rely on the national system 
of bankruptcy courts might with more confidence trust the Stern Court’s 
promise that its constitutional ruling was far from earthshattering in its 
effects.289 The list goes on.290 
With respect to form, one might see more rulings akin to that reached in 
a case like United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs.291 In this case, the Court 
recognized the constitutional need for an obscenity statute to include certain 
time limits that were lacking in the statute’s plain text. Construing this 
problem as an issue of constitutional avoidance—perhaps to avoid the 
criticism that would arise if it had invoked severability—the Court refused to 
declare the entire statute invalid. (Tellingly, it cited the statute’s severability 
clause in support.) It instead concluded that it would develop and impose the 
missing time limits itself. Explaining that it saw “no reason for declining to 
specify the time limits which must be incorporated into [the statute]—a 
specification that is fully consistent with congressional purpose and that will 
obviate the constitutional objections raised by claimant,”292 the Court set forth 
a detailed regime for the statutorily unspecified time limits,293 and began 
applying the statute, so construed, where it could be applied.294 
The approach of Thirty-Seven Photographs is characterized by judicial 
creativity and a willingness to expand on the statutory text. As such, it is 
reminiscent of the “judicial legislation” that so many find offensive and makes 
this 1971 case feel like an anachronism. Yet in a world where everyone on the 
Supreme Court agrees that “legislative intent” must control severability 
analysis,295 the approach of Thirty-Seven Photographs is normatively defensible 
where the current regime is not. 
Under the improved regime, of course, many rulings would remain the 
same. In response to a given constitutional disruption, Congress very well may 
prefer a response authorized by the traditional severability framework: that is, 
invalidation of the challenged statute either in whole or in part. And on the 
flip side, rulings under this improved analytical regime would rarely, if ever, 
lead to results so radical as to become unrecognizable under the current 
 
 289.  See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 290.  See supra notes 219, 221–22 and accompanying text. 
 291.  United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). 
 292.  Id. at 372–73. 
 293.  See id. at 373–74 (“Accordingly, we construe § 1305 (a) to require intervals of no more 
than 14 days from seizure of the goods to the institution of judicial proceedings for their 
forfeiture and no longer than 60 days from the filing of the action to final decision in the district 
court. No seizure or forfeiture will be invalidated for delay, however, where the claimant is 
responsible for extending either administrative action or judicial determination beyond the 
allowable time limits or where administrative or judicial proceedings are postponed pending the 
consideration of constitutional issues appropriate only for a three-judge court.”). 
 294.  Id. at 374 (“So construed, § 1305(a) may constitutionally be applied to the case before 
us.”). 
 295.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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regime. To return to the ACA-based hypothetical discussed above,296 this 
improved analytical regime would not justify a court’s development of single-
payer health-care regime to cure the ACA’s constitutional defects. The 
explanation for why it would not, however, is not based on arbitrary 
restrictions. As discussed above, it boils down to legislative intent. Under any 
reasonable reading of the ACA, it seems clear that the legislative preference 
would be for the implementation of other options (up to and including 
complete invalidation of the ACA) over the requirement that the courts 
develop, from scratch and in unprecedented fashion, an extraordinarily 
complicated single-payer regime.297 
Discussion of this ACA hypothetical nevertheless helps to provide greater 
nuance to the improved analytical regime. Courts employing this new regime 
reasonably could exercise a presumption, for example, that Congress does not 
intend wholesale revisions of a statute in response to that statute’s 
constitutional disruption. Congress would need to overcome this 
presumption before a court would wade into such rocky and difficult waters. 
A so-called severability clause,298 by contrast, might provide at least some 
evidence of legislative intent to preserve as many applications of a statute as 
possible, even when that preservation would require construing the statute in 
a more creative (or less text-bound) manner. These sorts of presumptions and 
understandings would help courts work through the inevitably difficult task 
of discerning legislative intent in the context of constitutionally disrupted 
statutes. 
There nevertheless remain at least three concerns raised by the 
alternative regime.299 The first relates to whether it would give Congress an 
undesirable incentive to enact unconstitutional statutes. Rather than force 
 
 296.  See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 297.  In a hypothetical world where Congress had expressed the converse set of preferences, 
thereby charging the court with the development of such a complicated regime, the court would 
have an exceptionally difficult task on its hands—but under well-accepted principles of federal 
common law making, it is not clear how it could justify a refusal even to try. See supra notes  
268–69 and accompanying text. 
 298.  See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“If any provision of this chapter, or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the 
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.”). 
 299.  In addition to these three concerns, one might voice an objection on the grounds of 
stare decisis. This concern is valid. Yet the principles of stare decisis—to the extent they can be 
meaningfully understood, see Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 411, 424 (2010)—allow reversal when the rule in question is, among other factors, 
unworkable as a practical matter. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 
(1992). Severability’s unworkability is demonstrated by its arbitrarily destructive effects as well as 
the inconsistencies and confusion it introduces to related doctrines. Still, to the extent that one 
nevertheless wishes to follow stare decisis, a more moderate response to severability’s failings may 
be to turn to other legal contexts and labels (for example, the doctrines relating to “remedy”) 
rather than severability whenever case precedent allows for either option. See supra Part III.A 
(describing acceptability of analytical approaches in contexts outside of severability). 
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Congress to draft its statutes within constitutional bounds or suffer the 
consequence of either partial or total invalidation, the improved regime 
would allow Congress to draft flawed statutes and then rely on the courts to 
implement its preferred alternative.300 To be clear, the concern is not that the 
new regime would require courts to enforce a statute’s unconstitutional 
applications. Rather, it is that the new regime would not adequately, in a 
sense, punish Congress—through greater damage to statutes than otherwise 
would be necessary—for failing to draft legislation that is in accord with court-
developed constitutional law. Under this theory, a more accommodating 
regime might lead to poorly drafted statutes and confusion with respect to 
lines of accountability. 
At the outset, this first concern assumes it is the job of the courts to 
discipline Congress with respect to its efforts to comply with the Constitution. 
Accepting this assumption for the sake of argument,301 it quickly becomes 
clear that severability is an exceedingly clumsy tool for such a task. It is 
overinclusive, as it threatens to dismantle even those statutes that Congress 
clearly has enacted in an effort to comply with the Constitution.302 It also 
ignores the reality that constitutional law doctrines, which are constantly 
changing, occasionally develop in ways that Congress may be incapable of 
predicting.303 Given that it is unrealistic to expect Congress accurately to 
predict every future constitutional ruling, punishing Congress for failing at 
this task becomes both chilling and arbitrary. 
Using severability as a tool to discipline Congress also is underinclusive. 
As revealed above by the hypothetical statute violating the Ex Post Facto 
Clause,304 a legislature hoping to punt a constitutional determination to the 
 
 300.  Sources raising this concern include Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 
320, 330 (2006), and Gans, supra note 24, at 675–83. 
 301.  The contention underlying this assumption is the subject of rigorous scholarly debate. 
See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial 
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 62 (2008) (exploring the extent to 
which “reviewing courts may implement constitutional guarantees more effectively by crafting 
doctrines that raise the costs to government decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally 
problematic policies”); cf. Brianne J. Gorod, The Collateral Consequences of Ex Post Judicial Review, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 903, 959 (2013) (exploring ways in which the courts might assist Congress’s 
attempts at discerning constitutional law rather than punish its errors ex post). 
 302.  See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 97 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(acknowledging that Congress enacted the 1984 revisions to the Bankruptcy Code—later 
invalidated in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502–03 (2011)—in an effort to comply with recent 
developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 303.  See, e.g., John K. DiMugno, The Affordable Care Act After the Supreme Court’s Ruling: An 
Overview, 22 EXPERIENCE, no. 3 at 10, 15 (2013) (“The Court’s willingness to review Congress’s 
power under the Spending Clause [with respect to the ACA’s Medicaid program] took many by 
surprise . . . .”); cf. David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against 
PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805 (2014) (discussing the incredulity with which many law 
professors initially had responded to the theory of the Commerce Clause eventually adopted by 
the Supreme Court in National Federation). 
 304.  See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
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court often can do so, consistent with severability’s restrictive framework, 
simply by drafting the statute in a manner that allows for partial invalidation. 
And if the lines of accountability are blurred under the new regime, then they 
are blurred under severability as well—under either regime, the court is 
forced to articulate the relevant line.305 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to develop or defend a better 
way of policing Congress (assuming, again, this is even properly within the 
courts’ role), a more sensible way of accomplishing this end might be through 
substantive constitutional doctrines that reject overly broad or vague statutes 
when the imprecision itself is what threatens to cause some particular harm. 
The courts have developed such a doctrine in the context of the First 
Amendment, for example, which helps to explain why so many successful First 
Amendment challenges result in the total invalidation of the implicated 
statute rather than its partial invalidation306—and why the new regime likely 
would have little effect on statutes challenged on First Amendment 
grounds.307 In short, the first concern not only depends on a contested 
assumption about the role of the courts vis-à-vis Congress; it also relies on a 
model for policing Congress’s work that is both damaging and ineffectual. 
A second concern raised by this Article’s alternative regime relates to 
abuse not by Congress, but by the courts. Under this theory, severability’s 
restrictions make it more difficult for judges to implement their personal 
policy preferences under the guise of effectuating legislative intent. 
Like the first concern, this second concern rests on a disputed 
assumption about courts and the doctrines they employ. Here, the 
assumption is that one role doctrine must play is to prevent courts from acting 
in bad faith. Assuming (again for the sake of argument) that this assumption 
is appropriate, severability again proves itself inadequate. Severability does 
not even attempt to discriminate between, on the one hand, judges who are 
actually trying to effectuate legislative intent and, on the other, those who 
would use that same project as mere cover. Severability instead ties the hands 
 
 305.  Gans, supra note 24, at 644 (arguing that severability, as it currently stands, “breeds an 
unhealthy dependency on courts and results in a loss of accountability”). 
 306.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (“[T]he 
Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech 
that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”). 
 307.  This discussion touches on a related concern. To the extent that the improved regime 
gives courts greater flexibility in construing constitutionally disrupted statutes, one might worry 
about statutes becoming unconstitutionally vague. This concern derives from the doctrines 
governing criminal and First Amendment law—see, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)—and in the context 
of severability, these same doctrines provide the answer. This is because the vagueness-related 
doctrines impose substantive constitutional limits, and those limitations would apply in the same 
manner under the improved regime. By definition, a construction of a statute that produces an 
unconstitutionally vague result is not one that cures the statute’s constitutional defects—and 
therefore is not an construction of a statute adoptable by a court. 
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of all jurists, including those who try their hardest to remain faithful to the 
will of the legislature.308 
Severability also fails to rein in disingenuous conduct. Judges willing to 
apply doctrines strategically to achieve certain statutory results have many 
tools at their disposal: they can insist on labelling their analysis not severability 
but something else (such as “remedy”) that allows them more freedom; they 
can develop substantive constitutional law doctrines that, in effect, compel the 
results they desire; and they, of course, can use severability itself as a way of 
achieving the destructive ends criticized in this Article. For courts committed 
not to following the law but rather to reaching certain outcomes, severability’s 
restrictions are both easy to circumvent and subject to manipulation—yet, 
with respect to this second concern, this is precisely the sort of conduct that 
severability purports to restrain. 
The third concern over the new regime relates to the difficulty of the task 
facing the court. Attempting to discern legislative intent with respect to a 
constitutionally disrupted statute is never easy. Expanding the range of 
possible outcomes (a step that is integral to the improved regime) may help 
to ensure that legislative intent actually can be effectuated, at least in theory. 
But on a practical level, it makes the judicial task more difficult. 
Under the new regime, courts would be able to use the analytical tools 
that always have been at their disposal in their attempts to discern legislative 
intent. A shift in the doctrine, moreover, would help courts develop new tools 
for effective statutory construction, as it would enlist litigants, judges, scholars, 
and others in the joint project of figuring out how best to answer these 
difficult questions. Despite all this, one must admit: the exercise very well may 
be irreducibly challenging. 
While such challenges are important to recognize, they are no defense of 
the current regime. Difficulty of analysis is hardly grounds for refusing to 
respond properly to a constitutionally disrupted statute. As Judge Katzmann 
recently has explained in a related context, “to jettison the inquiry altogether, 
because of the difficulty in particular cases, means that judges will interpret 
statutes unmoored from the reality of the legislative process and what the 
legislators were seeking to do.”309 In the context of severability, such 
unmooring comes at the direct cost of the democratic will. 
 
 308.  It is worth mentioning, in this context, the irony of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005). In this singular example of the Supreme Court employing a more flexible form of 
“severability” in response to a constitutionally disrupted statute, the so-called “remedial majority” 
was composed of four justices who had dissented with respect to the substantive constitutional 
claim. Stated otherwise, four out of the five justices who had determined the proper construction 
of the constitutionally disrupted Sentencing Reform Act had concluded that, in their opinion, it 
contained no constitutional flaw at all. In light of their support of the Act as it was enacted, it 
seems likely that those four were particularly committed to effectuating legislative intent to the 
full extent possible under the Constitution. And, tellingly, they did so not by reflexive resort to 
severability but by resisting severability’s restrictive framework. 
 309.  ROBERT KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 35 (2014). 
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Still, one might remain worried about the possibility of error. Particularly 
when faced with such a difficult task, there is always the possibility that the 
court will fail to reach the correct conclusion. In this context, error results in 
the implementation of a statute in a manner that Congress never intended. 
Again, this is a legitimate concern. Yet here the shift away from 
severability actually betters the situation, as the improved regime opens up 
the possibility that the courts will answer the question of legislative intent 
correctly whenever Congress prefers an approach that the severability 
framework refuses even to consider. Moreover, the improved regime allows 
Congress the same tool it always has in response to statutory errors by the 
courts: the “congressional ‘override.’”310 While practical realities may at times 
thwart Congress’s employment of this tool,311 the question then becomes one 
of preferable defaults. Is it better to accept, as a default, a court’s attempt at 
discerning legislative intent through an arbitrarily restrictive lens, such as that 
imposed by severability? Or is it better to demand that the court attempt to 
discern legislative intent without those arbitrary constraints? If the goal is to 
minimize judicial error, the answer is clear. The proposed regime—one 
dedicated to the effectuation of legislative intent without the arbitrarily 
restrictive framework of severability—is an improved regime. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Severability elicits widespread criticism. Yet rarely do courts or scholars 
question whether its framework should apply in the first place. In tackling this 
underexamined question, this Article has attempted to show why, contrary to 
near universal consensus, the framework of severability should be retired from 
the doctrine and replaced by framework a more accommodating of legislative 
intent. 
It is true that courts routinely employ severability analysis, without 
objection or even deliberation, after they conclude that a statute suffers from 
some constitutional flaw. Many scholars have joined the courts in reflexive 
acceptance. Once examined, however, the severability framework reveals its 
deeply troubling nature. It is an aggressively disruptive approach to statutory 
construction that encourages courts to dismantle legislation without adequate 
justification, all under the guise of judicial restraint. The source of the 
problem ultimately lies in the insistence—implicit but nevertheless 
fundamental to the severability framework—that a properly restrained court 
may respond to a constitutionally flawed statute in only one of two ways. Either 
it must disregard the statute either in whole, or in part. This artificial 
 
 310.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991). 
 311.  See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014); Richard 
L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 205, 209 (2013). 
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dichotomy limits the broad array of analytical tools that otherwise would be 
available to a court seeking to effectuate legislative intent. 
In light of its unjustifiably disruptive effects, severability should be 
abandoned. Courts instead should turn to a central goal purporting to 
animate the severability doctrine: limiting the “solution to the problem” 
through resort to legislative intent. A fundamentally broader inquiry into 
legislative intent—one that forgoes severability’s artificial restrictions—would 
require that a court identify, first, the constructions of a constitutionally 
defective statute that would diffuse its constitutional defects, and second, 
which among these options the legislature would prefer. The court should 
then implement the legislatively preferred option. 
Adoption of this regime would effectuate legislative intent, rather than 
reject it in favor of severability’s unjustified prohibitions on what the court 
may do. As such, it would resist pernicious practices in the case law, including 
those worsened by emerging trends toward greater and more frequent 
invalidation of statutes. It would, in short, better fulfill severability’s broken 
promise: to minimize the damage done to our statutes by judicial fiat. 
 
